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Foreword
COVID-19 has caused profound damage to human 
health, societies and economies in every corner of the 
world. This illness is zoonotic, a type of disease that 
transmits between animals and humans. It may be the 
worst, but it is not the first. We already know that 60 per 
cent of known infectious diseases in humans and 75 per 
cent of all emerging infectious diseases are zoonotic. 
Ebola, SARS, the Zika virus and bird flu all came to people 
by way of animals.
As we seek to build back better after COVID-19, we need 
to fully understand the transmission of zoonoses, the 
threats they pose to human health and how to minimize 
the risk of further devastating outbreaks. This requires an 
ambitious line of enquiry, in which this report, Preventing 
the next pandemic: Zoonotic diseases and how to break 
the chain of transmission, is a crucial first step.
The report—produced in partnership with universities, 
research institutions, UN agencies and the secretariats 
of several multilateral environmental agreements— 
identifies key anthropogenic drivers for the emergence of 
zoonoses, from agricultural intensification and increased 
demand for animal protein to the conversion of land 
and climate change. These drivers are destroying natural 
habitats and seeing humanity exploiting more species, 
which brings people into closer contact with disease 
vectors. Once established in humans, these diseases 
quickly spread across our interconnected world, as we 
have seen with COVID-19.
Understanding these drivers is essential to inform 
effective strategies and policy responses to 
prevent future outbreaks. This report makes many 
recommendations, all based on the One Health approach, 
which unites experts from multiple disciplines—public 
health, animal health, plant health and the environment 
—to deliver outcomes that improve the health of people, 
wildlife and the planet.
The recommendations include expanding scientific 
enquiry into zoonoses, regulating and monitoring 
traditional food markets, incentivizing the legal wildlife 
trade and animal husbandry to adopt zoonotic control 
measures, and radically transforming food systems. 
Above all, governments, citizens and the private sector 
need to work together. This is a global challenge that 
nobody can hide from. It crosses every discipline and 
every border. The drivers of pandemics are often also 
the drivers of climate change and biodiversity loss—two 
long-term challenges that have not gone away during 
the pandemic.
At the heart of our response to zoonoses and the other 
challenges humanity faces should be the simple idea 
that the health of humanity depends on the health of 
the planet and the health of other species. If humanity 
gives nature a chance to breathe, it will be our greatest 
ally as we seek to build a fairer, greener and safer world 
for everyone.
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Foreword
I am honoured to introduce this collaborative report by 
scientists of the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), the International Livestock Research Institute 
(ILRI) and the South African Medical Research Council 
in partnership with other UN and multilateral agencies 
and leading universities and research institutions. It is 
altogether fitting that environment, livestock and medical 
expertise should join up to help understand and stem the 
rise of human contagions.
This report will deepen the reader’s understanding of 
the virus causing the global COVID-19 pandemic and 
other pathogens that have similarly jumped species from 
their animal to human hosts. These ‘zoonotic’ diseases 
are increasing as the world’s growing human population 
broadens and deepens interactions among people, 
animals and environments.
To date, most efforts to control zoonotic diseases have 
been reactive rather than proactive. COVID-19 has made 
us all aware that it’s time to change that. To prevent future 
outbreaks of novel zoonotic diseases, we need to address 
the root causes of their emergence. We need among other 
things to break down disciplinary and organisational silos, 
to invest in public health programmes, to farm sustainably, 
to end the over-exploitation of wildlife, to restore land and 
ecosystem health and to reduce climate change. 
The only way to achieve all of this is to boost collaboration 
among agencies that work on environment, animal and 
human health. In the past two decades, ‘One Health’—a 
holistic, inter-sectoral and interdisciplinary approach 
that focuses on where the health of people, animals 
and environments converge—has emerged as the 
most promising way to prevent and manage zoonotic 
diseases. I have long championed use of ‘One Health’, but 
while experts agree that it is the optimal way to ensure 
a healthier future for all of us, this approach needs to be 
strengthened and mainstreamed everywhere, particularly 
the environment aspects of One Health, and it needs to 
receive vastly greater financial and institutional support. 
We must work in productive and novel ways across the 
human, animal and environment sectors and at every 
level—from village to ministry to global. This collaborative 
work by leading environment, livestock and human 
health organisations is an example of such vital cross-
sector work.
United and proactive in moving a healthy people-
animal-environment development agenda forward, 
governments, agencies and communities together can 
stop future zoonoses from happening. At the same time, 
these new coalitions will enable us to ‘build back’ healthy 
ecosystems while also meeting the world’s Sustainable 
Development Goals, with historic and enduring returns 
on investment. This report is an early attempt to outline 
ways by which institutions of all kinds—in government, 
business and civil society—might work together to create 
such a legacy.
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Key Messages
Key messages
This evidence-based scientific assessment has identified        
the following ten key messages for decision-makers:
1.  DE-RISKING FOOD SYSTEMS: Many new science-
based policy reports continue to focus on the global 
public health emergency caused by the COVID-19 
pandemic, following the fast spread of the infectious 
SARS-CoV-2 virus of zoonotic origin. We need more 
evidence-based scientific assessments, such as this 
one, to examine the environmental and zoonotic 
context of the current pandemic, as well as the risk of 
future zoonotic disease outbreaks.
2.  URGENCY: Diseases are emerging more frequently 
from animals. Rapid action is necessary to fill the 
science gap and fast-track the development of 
knowledge and tools to help national governments, 
businesses, the health sector, local communities and 
other stakeholders—especially those with limited 
resources—to reduce the risk of future pandemics.
3.  REPORT AUDIENCE: To help fill this gap, a scientific 
assessment was conducted to explore the role of 
wild and domesticated animals in emerging zoonotic 
infectious diseases. This rapid assessment is designed 
for decision-makers in government, business and civil 
society at all levels and in all regions.
4.  SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM: About 60 per cent of 
human infections are estimated to have an animal 
origin. Of all new and emerging human infectious 
diseases, some 75 per cent “jump species” from 
other animals to people. Most described zoonoses 
happen indirectly, e.g. via the food system.
5.  OUTBREAK FREQUENCY AND PREDICTABILITY:      
The frequency of pathogenic microorganisms jumping 
from other animals to people is increasing due to 
unsustainable human activities. Pandemics such as the 
COVID-19 outbreak are a predictable and predicted 
outcome of how people source and grow food, trade 
and consume animals, and alter environments.
6.  CONNECTIVITY AND COMPLEXITY: The links 
among the wider environment, biodiversity and 
emerging infectious diseases are complex. While 
wildlife is the most common source of emerging 
human disease, domesticated animals may be 
original sources, transmission pathways, or amplifiers 
of zoonotic disease. Such linkages—as well as the 
interconnectedness with issues such as air and water 
quality, food security and nutrition, and mental and 
physical health—should inform policies that address 
the challenges posed by current and future emerging 
infectious diseases, including zoonoses.
7.  DISEASE DRIVERS: Seven human-mediated factors 
are most likely driving the emergence of zoonotic 
diseases: 1) increasing human demand for animal 
protein; 2) unsustainable agricultural intensification; 
3) increased use and exploitation of wildlife; 4) 
unsustainable utilization of natural resources 
accelerated by urbanization, land use change 
and extractive industries; 5) increased travel and 
transportation; 6) changes in food supply; and 7) 
climate change.
8.  IMPACT AND COST: Emerging zoonotic diseases 
threaten human and animal health, economic 
development and the environment. The greatest 
burden of zoonotic disease is borne by poor people, 
but emerging infectious diseases impact everyone, 
with monetary losses of emerging infectious disease 
much greater in high-income countries. Given that 
a single zoonotic outbreak can incur trillions of 
US dollars in costs across the globe, prevention is 
significantly more cost-effective than response.
9.  POLICY OPTIONS: This assessment recommends 
ten policy response options to reduce the risk of 
future zoonotic pandemics and to ‘build back better’: 
(i) raise awareness of health and environment risks 
and prevention; (ii) improve health governance, 
including by engaging environmental stakeholders; 
(iii) expand scientific inquiry into the environmental 
dimensions of zoonotic diseases; (iv) ensure full-
cost financial accounting of the societal impacts 
of disease; (v) enhance monitoring and regulation 
of food systems using risk-based approaches; (vi) 
phase out unsustainable agricultural practices; 
(vii) develop and implement stronger biosecurity 
measures; (viii) strengthen animal health (including 
wildlife health services); (ix) build capacity among 
health stakeholders to incorporate environmental 
dimensions of health; and (x) mainstream and 
implement One Health approaches. These policy 
options are discussed in detail in Section Five of this 
report.
10.  ONE HEALTH: This report confirms and builds on the 
conclusions of the FAO-OIE-WHO Tripartite Alliance 
and many other expert groups that a One Health 
approach is the optimal method for preventing as 
well as responding to zoonotic disease outbreaks 
and pandemics. Adopting a One Health approach, 
which unites medical, veterinary and environmental 
expertise, will help governments, businesses and civil 
society achieve enduring health for people, animals 
and environments alike.
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Introduction
As the UN Framework for the Immediate Socio-economic 
Response to COVID-19, published in April 2020, says: 
“The success of post-pandemic recovery will also be 
determined by a better understanding of the context 
and nature of risk.1 In view of the COVID-19 crisis, this 
includes developing and maintaining a global mapping 
of encroachment, illegal trade, wet markets, etc. that 
are pathways for future pathogen transmission 
and thus potential future zoonoses identified. It will 
also mean supporting efforts to arrest ecosystem 
encroachments and harmful practices, restore degraded 
ecosystems, close down illegal trade and illegal wet 
markets, while protecting communities that depend 
on these for their food supply and livelihoods. This 
will be delivered in part by adhering to existing 
guidance by the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and 
the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS), as well as 
by delivering an ambitious agreement at the Fifteenth 
Conference of the Parties (COP15) of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD).”
By mid-2020 though, while the world grapples with the 
COVID-19 pandemic, most new papers and guidelines 
focus on the public health responses to the novel SARS-
CoV-2 virus and the pandemic it caused. These articles 
and reports emphasize the prevention and treatment 
of this contagious disease, or discuss ways to safeguard 
livelihoods, secure nutrition and re-build national or 
regional economies that are facing recessions. However, 
there are almost no scientific assessments that evaluate the 
issues that may hamper our global efforts to reduce the risk 
of future zoonotic pandemics in a post-COVID-19 world.
In the spirit of the above-mentioned UN Framework for 
the Immediate Socio-economic Response to COVID-19, 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)—the 
leading global environmental authority and advocate— 
has teamed up with the renowned International Livestock 
Research Institute (ILRI) and other key partners to develop 
an evidence-based assessment report on the risk of future 
zoonotic outbreaks.
This report is one of the first that specifically focuses on the 
environmental side of the zoonotic dimension of disease 
outbreaks during the COVID-19 pandemic. It tries to fill a 
critical knowledge gap and provide policymakers with a 
better understanding of the context and nature of potential 
future zoonotic disease outbreaks. It examines the root 
causes of the COVID-19 pandemic and other “zoonoses,” 
which the World Health Organization defines as human 
diseases or infections that are naturally transmissible from 
vertebrate animals to humans. The report also looks at 
where zoonoses come from and how we can reduce the 
likelihood of their occurrence. The report explores the 
role of animals, and in particular non-domestic animals, in 
emerging infectious human diseases. This is essential for 
our global efforts to improve our response preparedness 
because the frequency of spillover of pathogenic 
organisms jumping from animals to humans has been 
increasing considerably, due to the growing magnitude of 
our unsustainable natural resource use in today’s world.
The relationship between the environment, biodiversity, 
human society and human diseases is complex.2 While 
wildlife may be a source of human disease, domesticated 
animal sources may act as amplifiers of pathogens 
emerging from the wild. Moreover, as noted in this report, 
most emerging infectious diseases—whether in wildlife, 
domestic animals, plants or people—are driven by human 
activities such as agricultural intensification, wildlife use 
and mis-use, and human-induced landscape changes, 
interacting in unpredictable ways that can have negative 
outcomes. 
Against this backdrop, it is important to recognize that 
disease emergence is not only about the relationship 
between domestic animals or wildlife and people, but 
also about the complexity of the system as a whole and 
the interactions between biotic and abiotic components. 
Biodiversity, and the complexity of our landscapes and 
seascapes, is integral to social and ecological resilience.3 
It is also important to take into account the complex 
relationship between biodiversity and our mental and 
physical health, including non-communicable diseases as 
well as infectious diseases. The many linkages here include 
those related to air, water, food security, and nutrition.2 
Accordingly, the Convention on Biological Diversity has 
developed a biodiversity-inclusive One Health Guidance,3 
which looks at the One Health concept as a key ingredient 
for conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. The 
WHO defines One Health as an approach to designing 
and implementing programmes, policies, legislation and 
research in which multiple sectors communicate and work 
together to achieve better public health outcomes. 
This science-for-policy report provides examples of the 
application of the One Health approach and related policy 
response options that can be implemented by governments, 
civil society and the business sector in their efforts to tackle 
the drivers of zoonotic diseases with the ultimate goal to 
minimize the risk of future zoonotic disease outbreaks.
Introduction
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The emergence of the severe acute respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) at the end of 2019 and the 
vast global public health and economic impacts this novel 
coronavirus is causing in 2020 are treated as a crisis. While 
pandemics such as this are sometimes seen as a “black 
swan”—an extremely rare event—they are actually a 
widely predicted consequence of how people source food, 
trade animals, and alter environments.
To manage emerging infectious diseases (EID), including 
zoonoses, and reduce the risk of them becoming 
epidemics and pandemics, we need to understand their 
origins, their various types and importance in different 
communities, and their drivers. This section introduces the 
general reader to emerging diseases and zoonoses, before 
we take a deeper dive into the world of coronaviruses in 
Section Two.
What are emerging diseases and what are 
zoonoses?
People and other animals share many microorganisms 
and diseases; such co-existence is natural, common and 
important to health. Only a few of these cause disease. 
Considering the millions of species of microorganism on 
Earth, pathogens (microorganisms that harm the host) are 
extremely unusual. Only about 1,400 microorganisms are 
known as potential causes of human infections.
New diseases in humans can emerge either as a result 
of a change in the nature or behaviour of commensal 
microorganisms that cause disease, or through infection by 
novel organisms, usually through contact with animals and 
the environment, where most microorganisms exist.
About 60 per cent of human infections are estimated 
to have an animal origin,4 and of all new and emerging 
human infectious diseases, some 75 per cent “jump 
species” from (non-human) animals to people.5 In high-
income countries, direct infection with a zoonosis is 
probably a rare event,6 with most described zoonoses 
happening indirectly, e.g. through insect vectors or, more 
frequently, via the food system.7 Domesticated animal 
species share an average of 19 (range of 5–31) zoonotic 
viruses with people, and wild animal species share an 
average of 0.23 (range of 0–16) viruses with people.8 So, 
unsurprisingly, the vast majority of animals involved in 
historic zoonotic events or current zoonosis are domestic 
(livestock, domesticated wildlife and pets), which is 
logical as the contact rates are high. The emergence 
of a new wildlife zoonosis is extremely rare, but can be 
very significant.
Around 80 per cent of pathogens infecting animals are 
“multi-host,” meaning that they move among different 
animal hosts,9 including occasionally humans. Domestic 
animals and peri-domestic wildlife also act as bridges 
for the emergence of human diseases; this can occur in 
an evolutionary sense, or the animal could serve as a 
physical transmitter.
Some of these viruses generated in bio-insecure industrial 
and intensive agricultural systems result in zoonotic 
forms of the virus. An example is the highly pathogenic 
avian influenza (HPAI), an important economic disease 
of domestic poultry that evolves from low-pathogenic 
viruses that circulate commensally in the environment in 
wild bird populations. Another example is Rift Valley fever 
(RVF), where domestic livestock have served as amplifying 
hosts for the human- and animal-pathogenic virus that 
originally circulated between wild animals and mosquitos. 
The reservoir is the wild animal, while the domestic animal 
is the bridging host to human infection.
True human pandemic influenza viruses (rather like 
COVID-19) have a more complex evolution with mixing of 
viruses in different domestic animal compartments, usually 
pigs and poultry and interacting with human influenzas to 
produce highly pathogenic human influenza pandemics.  
While we are in the midst of an ongoing pandemic of 
COVID-19, recent decades have seen other headline-
hitting and dramatically destructive novel diseases. 
Amongst the more prominent examples are: zoonotic 
influenza (Bird Flu), pandemic human influenza (H1N1), 
Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), and severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), most of which have 
a proven or suspected domestic animal involvement in 
transmission; only SARS has a suspected peri-domestic 
wildlife reservoir, though yet unproven.
Other diseases, such as re-emerging West Nile fever, 
yellow fever and Zika virus diseases are indirect zoonoses. 
In recent decades, emerging diseases of zoonotic origin 
have had direct costs of more than USD100 billion; it was 
earlier estimated that if these outbreaks had become 
I
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human pandemics, the losses would have amounted to 
several trillion dollars.10 And this is likely to be the case for 
the current COVID-19 pandemic. Despite the massive real 
and potential socio-economic impacts of emerging zoonotic 
diseases, and despite the general consensus that prevention 
is better than cure, investments and political will to control 
them at their source have been insufficient to date.
Emerging diseases are of course hugely problematic, 
with some becoming epidemic (affecting a large number 
of people within a region), others becoming pandemic 
(spread over several countries and continents and 
affecting large numbers of people around the world). 
COVID-19 is now a pandemic spread across the planet, 
sickening and killing people and sending billions into 
lockdowns of various kinds as health services struggle to 
cope and killing hundreds of thousands by June 2020.
Also, of great importance to some countries and regions 
of the world are endemic zoonotic diseases. The so-called 
“neglected zoonoses” are continuously present in affected 
(mainly impoverished) populations, yet receive much 
less international attention and funding than emerging 
zoonotic diseases.11 Among the important neglected 
zoonoses widespread in developing countries are anthrax, 
bovine tuberculosis, brucellosis, rabies, cysticercosis (pig 
tapeworm), echinococcosis (hydatid disease), Japanese 
encephalitis, leptospirosis, Q fever, rabies, Lassa fever 
virus and trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness). Most of 
these are spread by domestic animals, but several have a 
wildlife interface, or wildlife is of occasional importance 
(brucellosis, leptospirosis, rabies, alveolar echinococcosis 
and bat-associated rabies). Only Lassa fever has exclusively 
a wildlife host (the multi-mammate rat).  
The bipartite network of zoonotic viruses sharing among domestic and wild mammalian hosts
Source: Johnson et al. (2020)8 published by the Royal Society under the Creative Common license (CC BY 4.0). The diagram legend has been modified for readability.
Johnson et al. (2020)8 analysed data on wild and domesticated mammalian species that share viruses with humans. The resulting bipartite 
diagram demonstrates the association between zoonotic viruses and mammalian host species. Host species harbouring the same zoonotic 
virus are linked by a virus node (                        ). Mammalian species nodes are coloured by domestication status and taxonomic order for non-
domesticated terrestrial wildlife. Species node size is relative to the zoonotic virus richness calculated in that species. Humans, who are host to 
all viruses, are not shown in the diagram.
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Neglected zoonoses persist in communities experiencing 
complex development problems—typically a mix of 
poverty, poor sanitation, poor access to water and waste 
removal services, isolation, socio-political insecurity, 
political marginalization, low literacy levels, gender 
inequality and degraded natural resources. These 
communities often have a high dependence on livestock 
and high contact with wild or peri-domestic wildlife, which 
increases their exposure to pathogens. Another often 
neglected category of diseases with mainly domestic 
animal origins are those that are foodborne. For poor 
people, some of the responses made to control outbreaks 
may inadvertently cause harm, for example by reducing 
access to animal source food, important for nutrition, as a 
result of large-scale culling of domestic animals.12
Remarkably, a recent study by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) found the burden of a selection 
of important food-borne diseases to be comparable to 
that of “the big three” major infectious diseases: HIV/
AIDS (human immunodeficiency virus-acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome), malaria and tuberculosis.13
Between 2018 and 2019, for example, South Africa 
experienced the world’s largest outbreak of listeriosis, with 
more than 1,000 laboratory-confirmed cases and more 
than 200 fatalities of people who got infected after eating 
contaminated food products.14
When do zoonoses become human disease 
outbreaks?
Historically, the emergence of new human diseases 
from animals has been associated with major societal 
change. For example, during the Neolithic transition 
from hunter-gathering to agricultural societies, humans 
lived shorter lives, ate less and poorer-quality foods, were 
smaller in size and were sicker than their hunter-gatherer 
ancestors. With the advent of agriculture, the dramatic 
rise in population and the settlement of people in close 
proximity to their waste led to increases in human disease; 
the domestication of animals led to livestock pathogens 
jumping species into people, where they became the 
probable cause of diseases such as diphtheria, influenza, 
measles and smallpox.15,16
Subsequent major plagues or outbreaks, associated with 
major societal stresses and upheavals, were linked with 
zoonoses or diseases that had originally jumped species 
from animals to people, but had subsequently become 
transmitted mainly from person to person. Some of the 
most dramatic ones are: 
1. The true zoonotic bubonic plague or pest (Black 
Death caused by the bacteria Yersinia pestis) of the 
mid-fourteenth century killed millions in Eurasia 
and North Africa, wiping out a third of Europe’s 
population.













1 in 7 babies of pregnant 
women infected with Zika virus
develops neurological problems 
Emerging zoonotic diseases
are those that newly appear in human populations or have 
existed previously but are now rapidly increasing in incidence or 
geographical range. Fortunately, these diseases are often not 
highly lethal and most do not spread widely. But some emerging 
diseases have enormous impacts. Ebola, HIV/AIDS and now 
COVID-19 are well-known examples of emerging zoonoses 
particularly harmful to human health and the economy.
 
Neglected zoonotic diseases
are mostly domestic in origin, and continuously present to a 
greater or lesser degree in certain populations. These common 
diseases affect mostly poor populations and are commonly 
neglected by the international donor, standard-setting and 
research communities alike as well as by national governments. 
It is likely that poor detection and surveillance of these diseases 
diminish their recognition and hence prioritization by 
researchers and policymakers.
Epidemic zoonoses
typically occur intermittently and are mostly domestic in origin. 
Examples are anthrax, leishmaniasis and Rift Valley fever. 
Epidemic zoonoses are often triggered by events such as climate 
variability, flooding and other extreme weather, and famines. The 
overall health burden of outbreak/epidemic zoonoses is much 
less than that of neglected zoonoses, but because epidemic 
zoonoses cause ‘shocks’ to food production and other systems, 
they can significantly reduce the resilience of affected 
impoverished communities
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people, increased in parallel. In general, these exploding 
human, livestock and pest populations have reduced the 
size of wildlife populations while paradoxically increasing 
contacts among people, livestock and wildlife (with 
more people hunting fewer wild animals in diminished 
and degraded ecosystems, and an increasing number of 
human-wildlife conflicts worldwide).
However, this broad-brush picture conceals some great 
regional and local differences. Some countries have 
declining rather than expanding human populations. 
And over the last century, “natural environments” have 
returned to depopulated rural areas (e.g., parts of the 
northeastern United States) as small farms proved 
unviable and farmlands reverted to forested lands. 
Despite these exceptions, overall there have been 
significant increases in human populations, encroachment 
of humans and livestock into wildlife habitats, and 
concurrent massive decreases in natural environments. 
These changes have important implications for 
ecosystem, animal and human health alike. One of these 
consequences is an increase in emerging zoonoses. Many 
of these diseases are emerging in high-income settings, 
but there is an increasing trend for these diseases to 
emerge in low- and middle-income countries.20-22
While still imperfect, our understanding of the factors 
favouring emerging diseases is growing. For example, one 
study makes the case that the risk of zoonotic emerging 
infectious diseases is elevated in forested tropical regions 
where land use is changing and wildlife diversity, in terms 
of mammalian species richness, is high.23 
2. Epidemics of European diseases in the Americas 
shortly after the arrival of Europeans in the 
sixteenth century were responsible for the deaths 
of up to 95 per cent of the indigenous populations 
and accelerated the destruction of their ancient 
civilizations.17 It is thought that more infectious 
diseases of the temperate zone emerged in the Old 
World, compared to the New World, because diverse 
species of animals capable of harbouring ancestral 
pathogens were domesticated in the Old World.16
3. The tuberculosis outbreak of the nineteenth century, 
associated with the industrialization in Western 
Europe and over-crowding, killing up to one in four 
people. Unlike the current situation, where most 
illness is caused by non-zoonotic tuberculosis, a 
substantial proportion of the nineteenth-century 
outbreak was thought to be caused by zoonotic 
tuberculosis.18
4. The expansion of colonial rule in Africa facilitated 
outbreaks of zoonotic sleeping sickness that killed 
one third of the population in Uganda and up to one 
fifth of the people living in the Congo River Basin in 
the first decade of the twentieth century.19 
5. The 1918 influenza pandemic killed some 40 million 
people in the last months of World War I and the 
following years (1918–1921).
The global human population has increased from 
about 1.6 billion in 1900 to about 7.8 billion today. The 
population of the domesticated animals that provide 
people with food, and of pests or “peri-domestic animals” 
(such as rats) that thrive in new environments created by 
Global hotspot map of estimated risk in zoonotic disease emergence  
Allen et al. (2017)23 analysed emerging infectious diseases (EID) of wildlife origin based on a broad set of predictors, such as the distribution of 
tropical forested regions, human population density, mammal species richness, agricultural land use, and others. The resulting heat map shows 
the global spatial patterns of estimated risk of zoonotic EID events after factoring out reporting bias. 
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Seven major anthropogenic drivers of 
zoonotic disease emergence
A broad range of studies on zoonotic disease emergence 
implicates the following seven main drivers of their 
emergence.20,24-26 Many of these drivers are now occurring 
in the same places, amplifying their impact. A description 
of each of these drivers is provided below.
1 . Increasing demand for animal protein
High-income countries have experienced little change 
in consumption of animal source foods during the last 
four decades. In contrast, Southeast Asia has seen a rapid 
increase: Since the 1960s, the share of the region’s daily 
food supply of proteins from animal products has doubled 
to 21 per cent; from fish, it has increased by half to 15 per 
cent. The share of total calories from both fish and animal 
products doubled to total of 12 per cent of the supply. 
Meanwhile, South Asia has also seen an increase in animal 
protein consumption, but not as strong. Sub-Saharan 
Africa has also followed the pattern seen in Southeast 
Asia, although it has been less marked. This per capita 
increase in animal protein consumption in many low- 
and middle-income countries has been accompanied by 
significant growths in population. Together, these factors 
have driven a strong growth in meat production (+260 
per cent), milk (+90 per cent), and eggs (+340 per cent) 
over the last 50 years. This trend is predicted to continue in 
the coming decades, with most growth in animal-source 
food consumption occurring in low- and middle-income 
countries. Compared with other protein sources, livestock 
product consumption is rising rapidly, whereas the long-
term trend for pulses is of sustained consumption levels.
2 .  Unsustainable agricultural intensification
Increasing demand for animal-source foods stimulates the 
intensification and industrialization of animal production. 
The intensification of agriculture, and in particular of 
domestic livestock farming (animal husbandry), results in 
large numbers of genetically similar animals. 
These are often bred for higher production levels; more 
recently, they have also been bred for disease resistance. 
As a result, domestic animals are being kept in close 
proximity to each other and often in less than ideal 
conditions. Such genetically homogenous host populations 
are more vulnerable to infection than genetically diverse 
populations, because the latter are more likely to include 
some individuals that better resist disease. Factory farming 
of pigs, for example, promoted transmission of swine flu 
due to a lack of physical distancing between the animals.27 
In poorer countries, there are additional risk factors in 
that livestock production often occurs close to cities, 
while biosecurity and basic husbandry practices are often 
inadequate, animal waste is often poorly managed, and 
antimicrobial drugs are used to mask poor conditions or 
practices. Since 1940, agricultural intensification measures 
such as dams, irrigation projects and factory farms have 
been associated with more than 25 per cent of all—and 
more than 50 per cent of zoonotic—infectious diseases 
that have emerged in humans.28 Moreover, around one 
third of croplands are used for animal feed. In some 
countries, this is driving deforestation.29
3 . Increased use and exploitation of wildlife
There are many ways in which wildlife are used and traded. 
Section three provides more detail on the complexities. 
However, in general, an increasing use and exploitation of 
wildlife includes the following: 
1. Harvesting wild animals (wild meat, sometimes called 
“bushmeat”) as a source of protein, micronutrients 
and money for the poor;
2. Recreational hunting and consumption of wildlife as a 
status symbol; 
3. Consumption of wildlife in the belief that wild meat is 
fresh, natural, traditional and safe;
4. Trade in live animals for recreational use (pets, zoos) 
and for research and medical testing; and
5. Use of animal parts for decorative, medicinal and 
other commercial products.
In general, use and trade in live and dead animals can 
lead to increased close contact between animals and 
people throughout the supply chain, which increases 
the risk of zoonotic disease emergence. In some regions, 
as human populations and wealth have increased, there 
has also been an increased demand for wild animals and 
their products. In West Africa, for example, exploitation of 
wildlife for food has increased over the last 10 years.30
Infrastructural development can often facilitate wildlife 
exploitation: new roads in remote areas can increase 
Pathogen flow at the wildlife-livestock-human 
interface
Source: Adapted from Jones et al. (2013)25
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human access to wildlife and help spread diseases within 
and between countries more rapidly. As animals in the 
wild become scarcer, attention has turned to the farming 
of some species of wild animals.31 While this might have 
the potential to reduce the pressure on wildlife, farming 
wildlife or “ranching” is often more costly than harvesting or 
hunting animals from the wild, and less preferred by local 
communities; it also may create cover for the “laundering” 
of wild animals.32 In addition, any significant increase in the 
farming of wild animals risks “recapitulating” the increases 
in zoonoses that likely accompanied the first domestication 
of animals in the Neolithic era, some 12,000 years ago.16
4 . Unsustainable utilization of natural resources 
accelerated by urbanization, land use change 
and extractive industries
Rapid urbanization, especially when unplanned and with 
poor infrastructure, creates novel and diverse contacts 
among wildlife, livestock and people. The greater 
movement of people, animals, food and trade that is 
associated with accelerated urbanization often provides 
favourable grounds for the emergence of infectious 
diseases, including zoonoses. For example, irrigation 
systems encourage some vector-borne zoonoses to 
spread; deforestation and fragmentation of ecosystems 
and wildlife habitats encourage contacts at the human-
livestock-wildlife ecosystem interface;32 and increased 
human settlements and fencing constrain herding and 
migratory movements of both domesticated and wild 
animals. Ecological tourism and human settlements near 
caves and forested areas, particularly those with poor 
housing conditions, can increase human-wildlife contacts 
and human exposure to insects, ticks and other vectors of 
wildlife pathogens.
Infrastructure development, including new roads and 
railways, transformation of natural areas to commercial and 
retail use, and other drivers of land-use change can also 
contribute to the destruction and fragmentation of wildlife 
habitats and increase human-wildlife contact and conflict.
Encroachment into wildlife habitats that are altered 
for the purpose of extracting their natural resources—
e.g., mining, oil and gas extraction, logging but also 
harvesting bat guano—also encourages new or expanded 
interactions between people and wildlife. These activities 
often come with other changes, such as new human 
settlements, road building and movements of people 
and products, which further increase human access to 
wilderness areas and often provoke changes in how local 
communities acquire and store their food (e.g., via wildlife 
hunting, introduction of livestock rearing, and keeping 
food stocks that attract pest animals).
5 . Travel and transportation
Diseases can now move around the world in periods 
shorter than their incubation periods (the time between 
exposure to a pathogen and the first clinical sign of 
illness). The increasing amounts of human travel and 
trade, including the increasing handling, transport and 
(legal and illegal) trade of animals and animal products, 
increases the risk of zoonotic diseases emerging and 
spreading. 
6 . Changes in food supply chains
Food supply chains are lengthening and diversifying, 
especially in low- and middle-income countries. This 
trend—which is being driven by increased demand for 
animal source food, new markets for wildlife food, and 
poorly regulated agricultural intensification—is creating 
additional opportunities for disease transmission. These 
include the following:
1. There are increased opportunities for cross-
contamination.
2. It can be more difficult to identify where a given food 
comes from. Traceability challenges make it harder 
for officials to follow up quickly on any potential 
problems.
3. Changes in processing can encourage the 
proliferation of zoonotic diseases (e.g., the formation 
of biofilms—microbial ecosystems—in food 
processing plants).
4. Rapidly expanding and poorly managed informal 
wildlife and fresh produce markets (including so-
called “wet” markets) bring products along poorly 
regulated supply chains to supply rapidly growing 
cities. While traditional markets provide many 
benefits, especially for poor people—including their 
convenience, lower costs, sales of traditional foods, 
and support of livelihoods (especially women)—their 
levels of hygiene are often low, and biosecurity is 
poor, increasing the risks of disease. The same is often 
true along the supply chains from rural areas to the 
markets in the cities. 
5. Industrial meat processing plants can also be sites 
of disease transmission. Food from modern retail 
outlets is not always safer than that from informal 
markets.33 For example, there have been many 
          Video: How can animals make you ill?
Video Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J5qLKWUTNM4 |
© RIVM/Government of the Netherlands 
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Impacts of climate change on zoonoses 
Climate change is a major factor in disease emergence. The survival, reproduction, abundance and 
distribution of pathogens, vectors and hosts can be influenced by climatic parameters affected by climate 
change. For example, climate variability tends to affect the many diseases transmitted by insects, ticks and 
other arthropod vectors. Warmer temperatures could also increase the incidence of disease both by 
increasing the vector population size and distribution and by increasing the duration of the season in which 
infectious vector species are present in the environment. Many newly emerging infectious diseases arise in 
tropical regions where the warm temperatures suit the lifecycles of both pathogen and vector.16 The impacts 
of climate change on zoonotic diseases as well as on food and economic insecurity and other problems 
are predicted to be harshest in low- and middle-income countries, where disease surveillance and data are 
particularly scarce.37 
Climate change is a force of growing importance that influences the future geographic distribution and 
abundance of species such as bats, monkeys and rodents, including those in which zoonotic pathogens 
often originate; and of mosquitos and other vectors that transmit viruses such as the chikungunya virus and 
West Nile virus. Climate change can increase or decrease the incidence of the insect-transmitted Chagas 
disease, sand-fly transmitted leishmaniasis, and other vector-borne and zoonotic diseases, generally with 
greater illness occurring at higher degrees of warming.38 In 2010 in Africa, an outbreak of Rift Valley fever, a 
mosquito-borne zoonotic disease, occurred with higher than average seasonal rainfall; other outbreaks have 
occurred even with short periods of heavy rainfall.16 
An extensive literature review of emerging diseases in Brazil revealed relationships between infectious 
diseases outbreaks and (1) extreme climate events (El Niño, La Niña, heatwaves, droughts, floods, increased 
temperature, higher rainfall), the frequency of which might be affected by climate change; and (2) 
environmental changes (habitat fragmentation, deforestation, urbanization, wild meat consumption).39 
Arctic and subarctic regions are especially vulnerable to climate change due to the thawing of the 
permafrost, which significantly transforms soil structures, vegetation and habitats. Degradation of the 
permafrost can expose historic burial grounds, enabling the revival of deadly infections from the past.40 
Rising temperatures are raising the risk of zoonotic diseases in the vast Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) which 
makes up one fifth of Russia’s territories. Extended growing periods and expanded habitats are providing 
some zoonotic pathogens and their vectors with more favourable living conditions.
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outbreaks of COVID-19 from the massive, crowded, 
artificially chilled industrial meat plants in Europe 
and America, but much fewer from smaller, naturally 
ventilated meat plants in many low- and middle-
income countries. Thus, it cannot always be assumed 
that the modernization of food value chains will 
reduce risk. Moreover, especially in low- and middle-
income countries, people are consuming more 
animal-source foods than in the past, which results in 
potential exposure to pathogens, including zoonotic 
pathogens.34
7 . Climate change
 Many zoonoses are climate sensitive and a number 
of them will thrive in a warmer, wetter, more disaster-
prone world foreseen in future scenarios.35 Some 
pathogens, vectors and host animals probably 
fare more poorly under changing environmental 
conditions, disappearing in places and resulting in 
the loss of their population-moderating effects or the 
establishment of other species in the new ecological 
niches created by their departure. There is some 
speculation that the SARS-CoV-2 may survive better 
in cooler, drier conditions when outside the body.36
Caster bean tick, deer tick or sheep tick (Ixodes ricinus) is a well-known vector of Lyme disease in Europe
Section I | Overview of emerging infectious diseases including zoonoses18
Preventing the next pandemic: 
Zoonotic diseases and how to break the chain of transmission
Immunodeficiency disorders in primates
Two of the most significant zoonotic disease transmissions in recent history are the human 
immunodeficiency viruses, HIV-1 and HIV-2, the etiologic agents for acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS) in humans.41,42
The closest relatives of HIV-1 are simian immunodeficiency viruses (SIVs) that infect wild-living chimpanzees 
(Pan troglodytes troglodytes) and gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) in Western Equatorial Africa. Chimpanzees 
were the original hosts of this clade of viruses. Four lineages of HIV-1 have arisen by independent cross-
species transmissions to humans and one or two of those transmissions may have been via gorillas.43
On the other hand, the closest relatives of HIV-2 are simian immunodeficiency viruses in a monkey, the 
sooty mangabey (Cercocebus atys), whose natural range is in west Africa.44 SIV-HIV species crossing seem 
to have occurred originally at least six times between sooty mangabeys (primate) and humans.45 Sooty 
mangabeys and chimpanzees are both often kept as pets and used for food, thus resulting in their frequent 
direct contact with humans.46,47
More than 40 species of African monkeys are infected with their own, species-specific SIV.47-49 These 
viruses are of relatively low pathogenicity and they do not induce an AIDS-like disease in their natural 
hosts, suggesting that they have associated and evolved with their hosts over an extended period of time. 
However, recent evidence shows that SIVcpz can cause AIDS-like disease and reduced fertility in Eastern 
Chimpanzees.50
The conclusion that HIV-1 was derived from a virus infecting chimpanzees is of particular interest, because 
chimpanzees and humans are so closely related. This raises a number of interesting questions: 1) as to 
the origin of the chimpanzee virus; 2) whether adaptation of SIVcpz to infecting chimpanzees made 
the virus more capable of infecting humans; and 3) whether SIVcpz infection of chimpanzees is of low 
pathogenicity or not.43 Based on the analysis of strains found in four species of monkeys from Bioko Island 
in Equatorial Guinea, which was isolated from the mainland by rising sea level about 11,000 years ago, it 
has been concluded that SIV has been present in monkeys and apes for at least 30,000 years, and probably 
much longer. Therefore, it is thought that SIV may have previously crossed the species barrier into human 
hosts multiple times throughout history, but it was not until relatively recently at the advent of modern 
transportation and global travel that HIV spread regionally and globally beyond decimations in local 
populations.51
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Chimpanzees in Uganda
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Other factors playing a role in zoonotic 
disease emergence
The seven main drivers of zoonoses emergence, described 
above, are all anthropogenic, that is, the result of human 
action. Other factors, of course, also affect disease 
emergence, particularly the agent type, virulence and 
modes of transmission of the pathogen; the susceptibility 
of the pathogen’s host; and the longevity and range 
of the pathogen’s animal reservoir. Pathogens that are 
widely distributed, mutate rapidly and are multi-host 
are considered most likely to jump species. RNA viruses 
mostly lack the “proofreading” mechanisms of DNA viruses 
and hence develop many more mutations as they evolve, 
some of which may make the virus better able to infect 
a new host. Pathogens that spread using the respiratory 
functions of the host (which are over-represented 
among emerging diseases) have fewer barriers to 
moving from one host to another than pathogens spread 
via other routes. 
Certain people are more susceptible than others to 
infection with pathogens. Age, health, sex, physiology, 
nutritional status, exposure history, simultaneous infection 
with more than one pathogen, immunocompetence, 
genetics and underlying diseases all influence an 
individual’s susceptibility to infection. Certain animals, 
in their turn, are more likely to harbour zoonotic 
or potentially zoonotic pathogens based on their 
physiological characteristics, ecosystem niche, social 
behaviour and relatedness to humans. Some studies 
detected higher numbers of zoonotic viruses in animal 
species that have become abundant and have expanded 
their range by adapting to human-dominated landscapes.8 
Livestock, rodents, bats, carnivores and non-human 
primates have been identified as of special concern in 
several studies. However, as with all animals, they are not 
risks in and of themselves, and it is only when there is 
close contact with people that there is the potential for 
this risk to be realized.
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Baby owls in a cage sold in an animal market in Yogyakarta, Indonesia
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In this second section, we move from zoonoses in 
general to the specific alarming and ongoing pandemic 
of COVID-19, a disease caused by a zoonotic coronavirus. 
The section starts with some background on 
coronaviruses and continues from the One Health 
perspective, reflecting both veterinary and medical 
experiences and commonalities between important 
coronavirus diseases and pandemics.
What are coronaviruses?
Coronaviruses are a large group of viruses that infect many 
animals and humans and are responsible for numerous 
diseases. They are named “corona” for the crown-like 
arrangement of the spike-shaped proteins on the surface 
of their membranes. Some human coronaviruses usually 
cause mild upper respiratory illness like the common cold. 
They can also cause serious diseases such as infectious 
peritonitis in cats and respiratory and enteric infections 
in cattle. The only known serious human coronavirus 
diseases are SARS, MERS, COVID-19, and possibly the 
Asian Flu from the late 19th century; all are likely to 
have zoonotic origins. In addition to these well-known, 
sporadic, locally important and long-established diseases, 
there have been at least six major outbreaks of novel 
coronaviruses in the last century, all of which imposed 
high costs across several continents:
1. Infectious bronchitis virus (IBV) causes infectious 
bronchitis in poultry. It emerged in the 1930s and 
is still one of the main causes of economic losses in 
the poultry industry, with repeated waves of disease 
caused by different strains.52
2. Transmissible gastroenteritis (TGE) virus was 
first reported in the United States in 1946 and 
subsequently spread to Europe, Africa, South 
America and China.53
3. Porcine epidemic diarrhoea (PED) virus emerged in 
1971 as a pig disease causing a global pandemic of 
enormous cost and is still a major problem in piglets. 
Since then different strains have caused waves of 
disease in Asia, Europe and the Americas.54
4. SARS-CoV, the coronavirus that causes severe acute 
respiratory syndrome, or SARS, was first reported in 
China in February 2003 and likely originated from 
bats, probably then spreading to other animals (likely 
civet cats) and then to humans. The illness then 
spread to more than two dozen countries in North 
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IIAmerica, South America, Europe and Asia before it 
was contained. Over 8,000 cases were reported and 
nearly 800 people died of the disease. Since 2004 
there have not been any reported cases.55
5. MERS-CoV, the coronavirus that causes Middle East 
respiratory syndrome, or MERS, was first reported in 
Saudi Arabia in 2012 and has a higher mortality rate 
than SARS. MERS-CoV can occur zoonotically from 
human contact with camels but has secondary cycles 
of spread from ill people to other people through 
close contact. To date, there have been around 2,500 
laboratory confirmed cases mostly human to human, 
of which more than one third proved fatal. Sporadic 
cases continue to occur as the infection remains 
present in dromedary camels.56
6. SARS-CoV-2, the coronavirus that causes a severe 
acute respiratory syndrome known as COVID-19, 
already has had its genome compared to the genetic 
sequences of more than 200 other coronaviruses 
from around the world that infect various animals. 
SARS-CoV-2 appears to be a recent mix, or genetic 
recombination, of coronaviruses.57 As a result of this 
recombination, one of the proteins of SARS-CoV-2 
enables the virus to enter the cells of humans. Other 
research has shown the virus to be 96 per cent 
identical to a previously identified bat coronavirus, 
with a common ancestor about 50 years ago. It is 
hypothesized that this is the origin of the unknown 
pathway that resulted in the transmission of SARS-
CoV-2 to humans in 2019.58
Alphacoronavirus
Alphacoronaviruses cause 
respiratory tract illnesses and 
common colds in humans, and 
gastroenteritis in animals. 
Betacoronavirus
Betacoronaviruses affect 
mainly mammals, and include 
those that cause MERS, SARS 
and COVID -19.  
Gammacoronavirus
They infect mainly avian 
species and sometimes 
mammals including cetaceans. 
IBV is a gammacoronavirus 
that causes avian infectious 
bronchitis.  
Deltacoronavirus
They are found primarily in 
birds and some mammals. 
Porcine deltacoronavirus 
(PDCov) recently emerged, 
causing severe diarrhoea in 
newborn piglets. 
For references see page 60.
Family of Coronaviruses
Coronaviruses are diverse. They belong to the 
Coronavirinae subfamily in the Coronaviridae family. 
The Coronavirinae subfamily comprises four genera: 
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Emergence of significant diseases caused by coronaviruses and other pathogens
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Natural reservoir: Large fruit 
bats (Pteropus spp.) or 
flying fox
Host: Pigs
Place of emergence: 
Guangdong, China
Nipah virus emerged as a 
respiratory and neurologic 
disease in pigs, and then spread 
to humans. A large outbreak in 
Malaysia from 1998 to 1999 
was followed by five outbreaks 
in Bangladesh from 2001 to 
2005. To control the outbreak in 
Malaysia, at least one million 
pigs were culled.
Highly pathogenic avian 
influenza (HPAI) or 
bird flu
Pathogen: HPAI virus subtype 
H5N1
Genus: Alphainfluenzavirus
Natural reservoir: Wild waterfowl 
Host: Poultry
Place of emergence: 
Guangdong, China
First human cases found in 
Hong Kong in 1997 were traced 
back to wild and domestic 
waterfowl in Guangdong in 
1996. Re-emerging in Hong Kong 
in 2002, the virus spread rapidly 
to South East Asian countries. 
Over 100 million domesticated 
chickens and ducks either died 
of the disease or were culled to 




Natural reservoir: Large fruit 
bats (Pteropus spp.) or 
flying fox
Host: Horses 
Place of emergence: Hendra, 
Australia
Sporadic outbreaks have 
occurred in Australia over 
the years since its initial 
appearance in 1994. So far, 
no cases have been reported 
outside Australia. Case fatality 
ratio is 75% in horses, and 
50% in humans. Hendra virus 







Place of emergence: 
United Kingdom
Mad cow disease is a 
progressive, fatal neurological 
disorder in cattle. The human 
form of the mad cow disease 
known as variant Creutzfeldt-
Jakob disease is linked to 
consumption of beef from 





Natural reservoir: Unconfirmed 
but likely to be African fruit bats 
of the Pteropodidae family
Intermediate host: Apes and 
monkeys
Place of emergence: Two 
simultaneous outbreaks in 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) and South Sudan
The largest outbreak in history 
occurred primarily in Guinea, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone from 
2014 to 2016, killing 11,323 
people. The virus also recently 
re-emerged in eastern DRC from 
2018 to 2019. Case fatality ratio 
of Ebola varied from 25% to 90%. 
West Nile fever
Pathogen: West Nile virus
Genus: Flavivirus
Host: Birds
Place of emergence: West Nile 
district, Uganda
Mosquitoes serve as disease 
vectors carrying the virus from 
infected birds to people and 
some mammals. Humans are 
usually incidental and dead-end 
hosts for the virus. The first 
recognized outbreak occurred 
in Israel in 1951, then Egypt. 
The virus re-emerged in 
Romania in 1996, and has 
established itself in the US 
since 1999. West Nile virus 
belongs to the same genus as 
dengue virus and yellow fever 
virus. 
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Natural reservoir: Probably bats
Intermediate host: Unknown
Place of emergence: Wuhan, China
SARS-CoV-2 appears to 
be a recent mix, or genetic 
recombination, of two coronaviruses. 
Genome sequencing suggests that 
SARS-CoV-2 is 96% identical to a 
coronavirus in horseshoe bats. 
Swine acute diarrhoea syndrome 
(SADS)
Pathogen: SADS coronavirus (SADS-CoV)
Genus: Alphacoronavirus
Natural reservoir: Probably bats
Host: Pigs 
Place of emergence: Guangdong, China
SADS-CoV caused severe and acute 
diarrhoea and vomiting in newborn 
piglets. The outbreak killed nearly 25,000 
piglets in Guangdong. Case fatality ratio: 
90% in piglets less than five days old. 
This coronavirus did not appear to jump 
to humans. 
Middle East respiratory 
syndrome (MERS)
Pathogen: MERS coronavirus 
(MERS-CoV)
Genus: Betacoronavirus
Natural reservoir: Probably bats
Intermediate host: Dromedary camels
Place of emergence: Saudi Arabia
First reported in Saudi Arabia, MERS 
has spread to 27 countries with a 
large outbreak in Korea in 2015. A 
study in 2018 shows high prevalence 
of MERS-CoV strains in local camels 
in Saudi Arabia, compared to 
imported camels from Africa. 
2003
Severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS)
Pathogen: SARS coronavirus 
(SARS-CoV)
Genus: Betacoronavirus
Natural reservoir: Horseshoe bats
Intermediate host: Masked civet cats
Place of emergence: Guangdong, China
This pneumonia-like infection spread 
from Guangdong, China, to more than 
26 countries in Asia, Europe, North 
America and South America before it 
was contained. SARS-like coronavirus 
has been found in horseshoe bats, 
suggesting that bats are natural 
reservoirs. 
Porcine epidemic diarrhoea 
(PED)




Place of emergence: United Kingdom
Following the first appearance in 
the UK, it spread to other European 
countries and Asia. A highly virulent 
PEDV strain emerged in 2013 and 
caused nationwide outbreaks in the 
US, and rapidly spread to North, 
Central and South American countries. 
The virus is not zoonotic and poses 
no risk to humans, or food safety.  
Avian infectious bronchitis




Place of emergence: 
North Dakota, USA
IBV causes an acute, highly 
contagious respiratory disease in 
chickens. It can also damage the 
reproductive tract, causing 
decreased egg quality and 
production. First documented in 
USA, the disease is now prevalent 





Pathogen: Zika virus (ZIKV)
Genus: Flavivirus
Natural reservoir: Primates 
including humans
Place of emergence: The Zika 
forest, Uganda
 
ZIKV was first discovered in a 
febrile sentinel rhesus monkey 
from the Zika forest, and in the 
Aedes africanus mosquito from 
the same forest a year later. 
The first human cases were 
detected in Uganda and 
Tanzania in 1952. An outbreak 
occurred in the Yap Islands, 
Federated State of Micronesia 
in 2007, followed by a major 







Natural reservoir: Chimpanzee for 
HIV type 1, and Sooty Mangabey 
for HIV type 2
Place of emergence: Kinshasa, 
Democratic Republic of Congo
 
Based on genetic sequencing and 
historical records, the emergence 
of HIV is traced back to 1920s in 
Kinshasa, DRC. It is thought that 
simian immunodeficiency viruses 
(SIVs) in primates crossed over to 
humans at the time, presumably 
as a result of hunting and meat 
consumption. SIVs then adapted 
to the new human host to 
become HIV.
 
For references see page 61.
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Natural reservoir: Large fruit 
bats (Pteropus spp.) or 
flying fox
Host: Pigs
Place of emergence: 
Sungai Nipah village, Ipoh, 
Malaysia
Nipah virus emerged as a 
respiratory and neurologic 
disease in pigs, and then spread 
to humans. A large outbreak in 
Malaysia from 1998 to 1999 
was followed by five outbreaks 
in Bangladesh from 2001 to 
2005. To control the outbreak in 
Malaysia, at least one million 
pigs were culled.
Highly pathogenic avian 
influenza (HPAI) or 
bird flu
Pathogen: HPAI virus subtype 
H5N1
Genus: Alphainfluenzavirus
Natural reservoir: Wild waterfowl 
Host: Poultry
Place of emergence: 
Guangdong, China
First human cases found in 
Hong Kong in 1997 were traced 
back to wild and domestic 
waterfowl in Guangdong in 
1996. Re-emerging in Hong Kong 
in 2002, the virus spread rapidly 
to South East Asian countries. 
Over 100 million domesticated 
chickens and ducks either died 
of the disease or were culled to 




Natural reservoir: Large fruit 
bats (Pteropus spp.) or 
flying fox
Host: Horses 
Place of emergence: Hendra, 
Australia
Sporadic outbreaks have 
occurred in Australia over 
the years since its initial 
appearance in 1994. So far, 
no cases have been reported 
outside Australia. Case fatality 
ratio is 75% in horses, and 
50% in humans. Hendra virus 







Place of emergence: 
United Kingdom
Mad cow disease is a 
progressive, fatal neurological 
disorder in cattle. The human 
form of the mad cow disease 
known as variant Creutzfeldt-
Jakob disease is linked to 
consumption of beef from 





Natural reservoir: Unconfirmed 
but likely to be African fruit bats 
of the Pteropodidae family
Intermediate host: Apes and 
monkeys
Place of emergence: Two 
simultaneous outbreaks in 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) and South Sudan
The largest outbreak in history 
occurred primarily in Guinea, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone from 
2014 to 2016, killing 11,323 
people. The virus also recently 
re-emerged in eastern DRC from 
2018 to 2019. Case fatality ratio 
of Ebola varied from 25% to 90%. 
West Nile fever
Pathogen: West Nile virus
Genus: Flavivirus
Host: Birds
Place of emergence: West Nile 
district, Uganda
Mosquitoes serve as disease 
vectors carrying the virus from 
infected birds to people and 
some mammals. Humans are 
usually incidental and dead-end 
hosts for the virus. The first 
recognized outbreak occurred 
in Israel in 1951, then Egypt. 
The virus re-emerged in 
Romania in 1996, and has 
established itself in the US 
since 1999. West Nile virus 
belongs to the same genus as 
dengue virus and yellow fever 
virus. 
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Natural reservoir: Probably bats
Intermediate host: Unknown
Place of emergence: Wuhan, China
SARS-CoV-2 appears to 
be a recent mix, or genetic 
recombination, of two coronaviruses. 
Genome sequencing suggests that 
SARS-CoV-2 is 96% identical to a 
coronavirus in horseshoe bats. 
Swine acute diarrhoea syndrome 
(SADS)
Pathogen: SADS coronavirus (SADS-CoV)
Genus: Alphacoronavirus
Natural reservoir: Probably bats
Host: Pigs 
Place of emergence: Guangdong, China
SADS-CoV caused severe and acute 
diarrhoea and vomiting in newborn 
piglets. The outbreak killed nearly 25,000 
piglets in Guangdong. Case fatality ratio: 
90% in piglets less than five days old. 
This coronavirus did not appear to jump 
to humans. 
Middle East respiratory 
syndrome (MERS)
Pathogen: MERS coronavirus 
(MERS-CoV)
Genus: Betacoronavirus
Natural reservoir: Probably bats
Intermediate host: Dromedary camels
Place of emergence: Saudi Arabia
First reported in Saudi Arabia, MERS 
has spread to 27 countries with a 
large outbreak in Korea in 2015. A 
study in 2018 shows high prevalence 
of MERS-CoV strains in local camels 
in Saudi Arabia, compared to 
imported camels from Africa. 
2003
Severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS)
Pathogen: SARS coronavirus 
(SARS-CoV)
Genus: Betacoronavirus
Natural reservoir: Horseshoe bats
Intermediate host: Masked civet cats
Place of emergence: Guangdong, China
This pneumonia-like infection spread 
from Guangdong, China, to more than 
26 countries in Asia, Europe, North 
America and South America before it 
was contained. SARS-like coronavirus 
has been found in horseshoe bats, 
suggesting that bats are natural 
reservoirs. 
Porcine epidemic diarrhoea 
(PED)




Place of emergence: United Kingdom
Following the first appearance in 
the UK, it spread to other European 
countries and Asia. A highly virulent 
PEDV strain emerged in 2013 and 
caused nationwide outbreaks in the 
US, and rapidly spread to North, 
Central and South American countries. 
The virus is not zoonotic and poses 
no risk to humans, or food safety.  
Avian infectious bronchitis




Place of emergence: 
North Dakota, USA
IBV causes an acute, highly 
contagious respiratory disease in 
chickens. It can also damage the 
reproductive tract, causing 
decreased egg quality and 
production. First documented in 
USA, the disease is now prevalent 





Pathogen: Zika virus (ZIKV)
Genus: Flavivirus
Natural reservoir: Primates 
including humans
Place of emergence: The Zika 
forest, Uganda
 
ZIKV was first discovered in a 
febrile sentinel rhesus monkey 
from the Zika forest, and in the 
Aedes africanus mosquito from 
the same forest a year later. 
The first human cases were 
detected in Uganda and 
Tanzania in 1952. An outbreak 
occurred in the Yap Islands, 
Federated State of Micronesia 
in 2007, followed by a major 







Natural reservoir: Chimpanzee for 
HIV type 1, and Sooty Mangabey 
for HIV type 2
Place of emergence: Kinshasa, 
Democratic Republic of Congo
 
Based on genetic sequencing and 
historical records, the emergence 
of HIV is traced back to 1920s in 
Kinshasa, DRC. It is thought that 
simian immunodeficiency viruses 
(SIVs) in primates crossed over to 
humans at the time, presumably 
as a result of hunting and meat 
consumption. SIVs then adapted 
to the new human host to 
become HIV.
 
For references see page 61.
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SARS-CoV-2 is an enveloped virus, meaning that its RNA is packaged within an outer lipid (fatty) 
membrane. The lipid membrane is stable enough to protect the RNA from the surrounding environment, 
but also able to break open inside the host cell to release the RNA. This balance means the membrane is 
susceptible to being destroyed by detergent.
The membrane contains several virus proteins. The large spike (S) proteins allows the virus to bind to and 
enter host cells. The distinctive ‘corona’ of spikes gives the virus its name.
Seven human coronaviruses have been identified so far, of which three are capable of invading deep into 
the lungs and causing more severe disease. One possible reason is that the S protein of SARS-CoV-2, like 
SARS-CoV (the virus responsible for SARS), binds to ACE-2 receptors on human cells. ACE-2 receptors are 
found throughout the body but are particularly concentrated in the upper and lower airways of the lungs. 
SARS-CoV-2 also binds to ACE2 particularly well. It is 10–20 times more likely to bind ACE2 than SARS-CoV. 
The membrane (M) proteins give shape and integrity to the virus particle. They are also thought to help 
assemble new virus particles inside the host cell.
The envelope (E) proteins are thought to assist virus growth and ability to cause disease. They may form 
small pores that alter the properties of the host membranes, prevent M protein from clumping together, 
and assist in assembly of new viral particles inside the host cell.
Inside the viral envelope is the viral RNA, which is bound to the nucleoprotein (N). N proteins form a tight 
spiral that wraps and coils the RNA, protecting it from damage. When the RNA is first released into the host 
cell, the N protein also reduces the host cell’s natural defences against the virus. 
The coronavirus RNA molecule is 30,000 ‘letters’ long, making it one of the largest RNA viruses discovered. 
While RNA viruses have a high mutation rate, coronaviruses also possess a genomic proofreading 
mechanism. This can keep them from accumulating negative mutations that would weaken them. 
Coronaviruses can also swap blocks of RNA with each other, potentially trading useful mutations.
While the new coronavirus likely originated from bats, it is not yet known whether or which mutations 
allowed this jump from animals to humans. The RNA of SARS-CoV-2 is 96% similar to a virus found in a bat 
in China. However, the bat virus contains key differences in its S protein, and is not able to infect humans. It 
is also likely that SARS-CoV-2 viruses will contain host cell proteins from previous host cells. The virus also 
makes additional proteins following host cell entry that allow it to multiply and make new virus particles. 
In addition to vaccine efforts targeting the S-protein on the virus particle, these intra-cellular proteins are 
potential targets for intervention.
Prepared by Annabel Slater, ILRI.
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Common elements and origins of 
coronavirus pandemics
The six coronavirus pandemics named above share some 
of the following common elements.
Bats
Bats are natural reservoir hosts as well as vectors of many 
microbes that can affect animals and people. Contact 
between bats and other animals, including humans, 
allows for inter-species transmission of the pathogens 
they harbour, potentially resulting in disease outbreaks. 
Most of the recent coronavirus pandemics have been 
hypothesized to have an initial origin in bats. More 
than 200 novel coronaviruses have been found in bats 
and they are likely the source and natural hosts for all 
coronavirus lineages.59 Bats are also associated with 
many other important zoonoses such as Ebola, Nipah (via 
bridging with pigs or indirectly through contamination of 
domesticated plants) and very rarely rabies. Bat species 
harbour at least 61 potential zoonotic viruses.60 They 
can resist, provide opportunities for recombination, and 
spread many serious zoonoses as a result of their unique 
physiological features (bats are the only mammals able 
to fly), ecology and immunology. At the same time, 
bats provide many ecosystem services such as flower 
pollination and seed dispersal for hundreds of species of 
plants, and aid in controlling insect populations; they also 
maintain ecosystems by providing food for predators such 
as owls, hawks and snakes.61
Agricultural intensification and increased 
demand for animal protein
These coronavirus disease outbreaks followed rapid 
intensification of agricultural practices and systems, 
and dramatic changes in the ways animals were kept 
or farmed, many of which were made without proper 
precautionary measures being taken. As mentioned 
previously, this was a demand driven process, associated 
with increasing wealth, allowing people to consume 
more animal source food. For instance, the emergence 
of infectious bronchitis virus in the United States was 
associated with post-World War I intensification of poultry 
systems based on bird confinement (resulting in greater 
stress and more frequent contacts) and new breeding 
techniques (resulting in less genetic variation and disease 
resistance). In addition, the transmissible gastroenteritis 
(TGE) virus and porcine epidemic diarrhoea (PED) virus 
were associated with post-World War II increases in 
intensive pig production systems and a related decline 
in pig health, similar to the case of industrialization of 
poultry production.
SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2 may be associated with 
wildlife harvest, trade practices and the intensification of 
wildlife farming in East Asia. The latter has been actively 
encouraged in some countries; by 2006, nearly 20,000 
wildlife breeding and farming ventures were established 
in China.62 As wealthy consumers tend to prefer wild-
caught animals, the meat from these farms is often 
consumed by China’s rapidly growing middle class.63
There is concern that many wildlife farms are prone to low 
biosecurity and that they also enable illegally poached 
wildlife to be “laundered”—presented and sold as legally 
farmed animals.31 Both factors would increase the risk of 
zoonotic disease outbreaks.
         Video: Novel coronavirus
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Colourized scanning electron micrograph of a cell (blue) infected 
with SARS-COV-2 virus particles (red)
Video Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mOV1aBVYKGA | 
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MERS-CoV was associated with increases in dromedary 
camel numbers and a shift from extensive to intensive 
camel production systems. An analysis of potential drivers 
of MERS-CoV emergence in Qatar suggests that the 
socio-economic transformation in the last three decades 
and the growing popularity of camel racing triggered 
major changes in camel farming practices.64 Camels were 
raised in designated camel complexes in a high-density 
environment alongside the workers who fed and took 
care of them. Races and contests in the Gulf region also 
required camels to travel frequently and extensively, 
both across borders and within the country. These factors 
played an important role in the transmission of MERS-CoV 
from camels to humans.
Traditional markets
Both SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2 have been associated 
with traditional informal markets or fresh produce markets 
(sometimes called wet markets). These markets sell fresh 
meat, fish and other perishable agricultural produce. 
Some of these informal markets sell live poultry and other 
domesticated animals; many sell live aquatic products 
(fish and shellfish); and some sell live or dead wild animals. 
The products can be sourced from many different places, 
including from distant parts of the world.
SARS-CoV was associated with civet cats sold in informal 
markets. SARS-CoV-2 has been associated with a 
traditional food market where wildlife was purported to 
be sold. Other studies, however, have cast doubt on the 
Photo credit: nutsiam / Shutterstock.com
Video: How do viruses jump from 
animals to humans?
Video Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xjcsrU-ZmgY |  
© TED-ED
initial emergence event leading to human infection.65,66 
There is general consensus that informal markets can 
be epidemiologically risky, especially those selling live 
domesticated animals or live or dead wild animals and 
those with poor hygiene.67,68 However, expert opinions 
differ as to whether live animal markets should be 
regulated more strictly, gradually upgraded with buy-in 
from vendors, or banned completely in order to reduce 
disease transmission risk. It should be noted that strict 
regulation of food has proven difficult in governance-
poor contexts and banning desired products often 
Flying foxes or fruit bats (Pteropus sp.)
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shifts the market underground.69 As mentioned earlier, 
informal, traditional or fresh produce markets have 
many benefits for people, including low prices, ease of 
access, the availability of preferred fresh and traditional 
foods, income-earning opportunities for women, worker 
independence, and attractions for tourists. However, 
these need to be weighed against the wider benefits to 
humanity (including local people) of preventing disease 
outbreaks and global pandemics. Ideally, solutions would 
be found that preserve the benefits while mitigating the 
risks of traditional markets.
High economic costs
The three recent human coronavirus outbreaks (MERS, 
SARS and COVID-19) have shown a relatively low human 
population mortality rate compared to historic plagues 
(some of which killed up to 90 per cent of the populations 
affected); relatively high lethality in comparison to colds 
or seasonal influenza; and intense social disruptions. All 
six coronavirus pandemics (IBD, PED, TGE, SARS, MERS, 
COVID-19) have had high economic costs and, for some 
diseases, very high animal mortality rates.
As of 29 June 2020, there were more than 10 million 
confirmed cases of COVID-19, including more than 
500,000 reported deaths. These figures are likely to be 
great underestimations of the true numbers of infections 
and deaths. With medical staff and facilities in frontline 
disease regions in or near overwhelm, COVID-19 may also 
be responsible for many more indirect deaths due to sick 
people choosing not to seek medical care because of their 
concerns about contracting COVID-19 in hospitals or not 
wanting to overwhelm health services. Reported to occur 
in 216 countries and territories (as of mid-June 2020) and 
on every continent other than Antarctica, the disease 
initially concentrated in “disease hotspots” experiencing 
Photo credit: US National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases 
Electron microscope image of the novel coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2 
(round blue spheres) in cell culture.
especially high disease burdens. These included, among 
others, Wuhan in China, Lombardy in northeast Italy, New 
York City in the United States, Madrid in Spain, London in 
the United Kingdom, and Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo in 
Brazil.
The huge health impacts of this new coronavirus 
necessarily imply enormous economic impacts. The 
International Monetary Fund predicts that the global 
economy will shrink by 3 per cent in 2020, a downgrade 
of 6.3 percentage points from estimates in January 2020. 
The Fund also estimates that over the next two years, 
cumulative output losses from the COVID-19 pandemic 
could reach USD9 trillion.
The International Labour Organization estimates that 
COVID-19 will wipe out 6.7 per cent of working hours 
globally in the second quarter of 2020—equivalent to 
195 million full-time workers. The Chinese economy 
shrank 6.8 per cent in the first three months of 2020, 
the country’s first such contraction on record. With the 
modern global economy so closely interconnected, much 
up- and downstream damage is anticipated. Among the 
more serious harms are the potential impacts on food 
systems, which could lead to more than a quarter of a 
billion people suffering acute hunger by the end of 2020, 
according to the World Food Programme. Countries 
highly reliant on food imports, such as Somalia, and 
those highly reliant on food exports, such as Nigeria, are 
equally vulnerable. The impacts of this disease are already 
being felt across many sectors. According to UNESCO, 
for example, more than one billion students worldwide 
missed attending school or university in April 2020.
A market in Guangzhou, China
Photo credit: tostphoto / Shutterstock.com
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This section considers how human activity contributes to 
the emergence of diseases at the environment-wildlife 
interface. Building from the anthropogenic drivers 
outlined in Section One, this section focuses on land-use 
change and the use or exploitation of wildlife; discusses 
evidence regarding the consumption, trade and other 
uses of wild animals; describes the driving forces behind 
these behaviours and actions; and focuses on the specific 
risks associated with wildlife use and consumption.
Habitat and biodiversity loss 
The FAO Global Forest Resources Assessment 2020 
indicates that deforestation continues globally at a rate 
of 10 million hectares a year.70 Rapid increases in the 
world’s human population from around one billion two 
centuries ago to over 7.8 billion today, has meant more 
and more encroachment of humans into natural habitats, 
which has brought humans and animals into ever-closer 
contact and increased the risk of animal-to-human 
disease transmission. Deforestation, particularly in tropical 
regions, has been associated with an increase in infectious 
diseases such as dengue fever, malaria and yellow fever, 
to name a few.71 This section discusses the association 
between habitat/biodiversity loss and the emergence of 
zoonotic diseases.
Anthropogenic land-use changes in Australia have 
contributed considerably to the rise of emerging and 
re-emerging mosquito-borne diseases, while forest 
fragmentation has increased the risk of humans 
contracting Lyme disease.32,72 An examination of 
circumstances surrounding outbreaks of rodent-borne 
haemorrhagic fevers suggests that anthropogenically 
disturbed, low-diversity habitats present the greatest risk 
for humans to contract hantaviruses, causing potentially 
fatal illnesses, or arenaviruses, which cause Lassa fever 
and other illnesses.73 Rodent populations are increasing 
in many areas. One explanation for this is that many 
predators that fed on rodents no longer inhabit disturbed 
habitats. An increase in the transmission of flea-borne 
diseases via small mammals due to human disturbance of 
habitats has been shown in several ecosystems.74 A study 
of zoonotic malaria, transmitted by macaques in Malaysian 
Borneo, confirmed the link between zoonotic spillovers 
and deforestation but showed complex and different 
effects of forest degradation at different scales.75 In 
general, increases in malaria prevalence may be associated 
with certain forms of landscape conversion, such as partial 
draining of wetlands, shrub height changes favoured by 
certain species, and changes in mosquito prey that affect 
mosquito abundance.
Several hypotheses attempt to explain the association 
between habitat or biodiversity loss and emerging 
infectious diseases. First, disturbed habitats often favour 
opportunistic or generalist species that happen to be 
reservoirs for viruses. Second, through a process called 
the “dilution effect,” more virus transmission events occur 
within a single species in communities that have low 
species diversity than in communities that have greater 
species diversity. In such cases, the single species is usually 
an opportunistic species that is the specific host of the 
virus. The dilution effect occurs because communities 
with more species dilute transmission events by reducing 
the number of susceptible animals. For example, in 
communities of higher biodiversity, disease-transmitting 
vectors feed on a larger variety of hosts that are poor 
reservoirs for the pathogen (e.g., West Nile virus and 
tick-transmitted Lyme disease).76 Nonetheless, ecological 
systems are complex, and empirical evidence for the 
dilution effect hypothesis has been inconsistent. The 
outcome depends on the pathogen transmission mode, 
among other factors. Dilution effects occur for most 
frequency-transmitted pathogens and amplification 
effects occur for density-dependent pathogens.77 
Moreover, while more biodiversity means greater viral 
richness, the risk of pathogen spillover stems from 
increased exposure, for example as more humans visit 
environments where pathogens are present.23,78
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Hunter prepares Bonobo bushmeat over a fire in Kilima, DR Congo
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Human respiratory pathogens have been transmitted to wild great ape populations many times, sometimes 
causing extensive ape mortality. Some of these pathogens tended to cause mild disease in adult humans 
but severe and even lethal outcomes in great apes, such as the human respiratory syncytial virus (HRSV) 
and human metapneumovirus (HMPV), as well as human coronavirus subtype OC43 infections of wild 
chimpanzees in 2016.79,80
Whether ape morbidity and mortality associated with the new coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, could be similar to 
that in humans is unknown. The fact that mild cases occur in humans is cause for grave concern for the great 
apes because asymptomatic visitors could pass the virus on to great apes.81 Governments, policymakers, 
conservationists, researchers and great ape tourism professionals are being encouraged to take actions 
to reduce the risk of SARS-CoV-2 being introduced in endangered ape populations. Many protected area 
authorities in Africa and Asia have already taken action, with tourism suspended at almost all great ape 
sites. The Primate Specialist Group, Section on Great Apes, and the Wildlife Health Specialist Group of the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) refer in a joint statement of 15 March 2020 to best 
practice guidelines for great ape disease control and tourism.82,83
Other diseases have had devastating impacts on both humans and great apes. Ebola, discovered in 1976 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in South Sudan, can afflict chimpanzees and gorillas as well as 
people. Pre-2005 Ebola outbreaks occurred deep in the rainforest biomes but subsequently shifted to more 
transitional forests in Uganda, DR Congo and Guinea, where forest loss might have played a role.84,85 
Previous Ebola outbreaks in Gabon and the Republic of Congo in the mid-1990s killed more than 90 per 
cent of the gorillas and chimpanzees in some areas, and additional outbreaks in these countries from 2000 
to 2005 killed thousands of great apes.86 It is estimated that it will take gorilla populations that experienced 
95 per cent mortality more than 130 years to recover.87
Respiratory infections and primates  
Photo credit: Sergey Uryadnikov / Shutterstock.com
A bonobo (Pan paniscus) in a forest of DR Congo
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Another hypothesis, known as the “coevolution effect,” 
which is rooted in ecology and evolutionary biology, 
proposes to explain the underlying mechanisms that drive 
this association between habitat or biodiversity loss and 
emerging infectious diseases.88 This theory suggests that 
as humans alter landscapes and former intact habitats are 
lost, forest fragments serve as islands harbouring wildlife 
hosts of pathogens that undergo rapid diversification, 
leading to greater probability that one of these pathogens 
will spill over into human populations, where they will 
cause new disease outbreaks.88,89 Maintaining healthy, 
well-connected ecosystems is important for migratory 
and resident species and also should help reduce the 
prevalence of infectious diseases.89 
Viral diversity is also associated with species diversity.78 
New research has predicted high rates of mammalian viral 
sharing in the tropics, particularly among rodents and 
bats, depending on their taxonomic similarity and overlap 
in geographic range.90 While the specific transmission 
mechanisms may differ by pathogen and interaction, the 
shared drivers of biodiversity loss, ecosystem change and 
disease emergence reinforce how biodiversity and wildlife 
conservation can play critical roles in protecting humans 
from emerging infectious diseases.
The roles of wildlife harvesting, farming 
and trade in pathogen spread
As noted above, wild animals are hunted and captured for 
human subsistence, for recreation and for the sale of body 
parts and their derivatives.91,92  They are also farmed for the 
production of food and products.
Wild meat hunting
Hunting has been part of many cultures for millennia. 
However, an important disease transmission interface 
between the environment and people is through the 
harvesting of wild animals. 
It is estimated that about 6 million (metric) tonnes of wild 
meat is harvested annually in Latin America and Africa.93 
One analysis found that, in Central Africa, meat supply 
from wild meat hunting might be higher (at 48g per 
person per day) than supply from domesticated animals 
(34g per person per day).94 A recent survey of nearly 
8,000 rural households in 24 countries across Africa, Latin 
America and Asia found that 39 per cent of households 
harvested wild meat and almost all consumed it.95 Animals 
that are often hunted for meat include large herbivores, 
primates, rodents, snakes and other reptiles. Mammals 
represent more than 90 per cent of the wild meat sold in 
markets in Central Africa.
The hunting of aquatic species has taken place for 
generations, but it is clear that many poorer coastal 
communities are becoming newly reliant on aquatic 
wild meat to satisfy their daily dietary requirements. 
These communities have also turned to this harvest for 
alternative sources of income.96 
Aquatic wild meat includes products derived from aquatic 
mammals and reptiles, including species of dolphins, 
whales, manatees, crocodiles and turtles, that are used for 
subsistence food, bait for fisheries and traditional uses. 
The products include shells, bones and organs as well as 
meat. Aquatic wild meat is obtained through unregulated, 
and sometimes illegal, hunts as well as from stranded 
(dead or alive) animals or through “bycatches” of non-
target animals caught by fishermen incidentally. 
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A leopard cat sold in a market
Section III | Understanding the linkages between habitat loss, the trade and use of wildlife, and the emergence of novel zoonoses32
Preventing the next pandemic: 
Zoonotic diseases and how to break the chain of transmission
Zoonotic pathogens are found in a variety of migratory species of wild animals (e.g., bats, ungulates, and 
waterfowl). While some zoonotic diseases in humans appear to have been tied to spillovers from migratory 
species, most of these events have resulted from human activities, such as direct consumption of wild 
animals, harvesting, handling and increased proximity of humans and livestock to natural habitats.
In the case of the current pandemic, while a bat species is a likely reservoir of the precursor to SARS-CoV-2, 
there is wide consensus that bats do not carry or transmit COVID-19 to humans. Misinformation has led to 
an unfortunate culling of bat populations in some parts of the world.
Some migratory species have been associated with the spread of zoonoses. Yet migration has also been 
shown to reduce transmission in some species.97 In particular, reduction of length or suppression of 
migration has been associated with increased load in pathogens.98 As climate change and habitat loss and 
fragmentation are profoundly affecting migratory behaviour, there is an urgent need to further investigate 
links between animal migration and disease infection dynamics.99 
The conservation status of many migratory species is declining worldwide. Many factors related to the 
increased occurrence of zoonotic diseases are the same as those that threaten the survival of migratory 
species.
A preliminary analysis of the status of migratory animals listed under the Convention on Migratory Species 
(CMS) identified consumptive use as the threat affecting most species.100 Consumptive use includes both 
legal and illegal trade, illegal killing, subsistence harvesting and recreational hunting. Overexploitation 
of wildlife has also been associated with an increased risk of pathogen spillover.8 Habitat loss and 
fragmentation is another major cause of migratory species decline. The loss of ecological connectivity, 
vital for migratory species, is of particular concern. Habitat loss and fragmentation have also been found 
to increase the likelihood of a spillover.101 Maintaining healthy, well-connected ecosystems is important for 
migratory species and also should help reduce the prevalence of infectious diseases.89 
Prepared by the Secretariat of the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals.
Migratory species and zoonotic diseases
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Driving forces of wild meat consumption 
The increasing consumption of wild meat in certain 
regions is driven by the following factors: 92,102
1. An increasing human population is demanding 
more protein-rich food and income that cannot 
be met with traditional resources—land, labour, 
livestock, capital—alone. Global population 
densities are increasing, especially in Africa, which 
has the world’s highest rate of population growth 
and is expected to account for more than half of 
the world’s population growth between 2017 and 
2050.103
2. Local communities have few incentives to conserve 
wildlife and wildlife habitats, and there are few 
attractive substitutes for these wildlife resources. In 
many cases, development projects such as chicken 
and pig farms have provided employment and 
animal protein to local communities, but failed to 
reduce pressure on populations of wild species.104 
In other cases, attempts to introduce domesticated 
animals into communities were unsuccessful. 
The wild meat trade also serves as a safety net in 
times of hardship, as it generates both protein and 
income for poor households.105
3. In some regions, there is a growing demand for 
wild meat among wealthy urban elites, for whom 
consumption of wild animals is a status symbol 
or a luxury good—or they simply prefer the rich 
taste. A survey estimated that around 83 per cent 
of sampled households in Brazzaville, Republic of 
the Congo, consumed wild meat.106 Less well-off 
city dwellers may also prefer wild meat, perhaps 
choosing less exotic or less expensive types.
4. Increasing connectivity between rural and urban 
populations is increasingly bringing poor and rich 
worlds together. In Asia and Africa, much wild meat 
as well as live wild animals are sold in informal 
markets. The lack of adequate biosafety measures 
makes these markets, where live wild animals are 
mixed together for their sale, a particular risk for 
zoonotic disease emergence.
Wild meat farming and ranching 
Over the last 60 years, wild meat production from both 
illegal and legal production of farms has been steadily 
increasing. Wild meat is also harvested from more 
extensive production systems in rangelands in the 
tropics, temperate regions and the arctic. The total global 
legal production reached 2.11 billion (metric) tonnes 
in 2018. In South Africa, wild meat contributes nearly 
USD500 million (ZAR9 billion) annually to the country’s 
GDP and employs over 100,000 people while also 
providing a considerably better return on investment 
than livestock production.107 In Europe, the value of game 
meat (including deer and boar) was USD347 million 
(EUR321 million) in 2014. Game meat also contributes 
significantly to local livelihoods and food security around 
the world.97,108-111 In these cases, using and trading wildlife 
is an economically viable land-use option that helps to 
keep habitats intact.
There are also concerns about zoonotic disease transfer 
to humans from both wildlife farms and more extensive 
rangeland management systems. In theory, wildlife farms 
could provide proper sanitary conditions that reduce 
the risk of disease transmission. But in reality, the risk of 
disease transmission with wildlife farms is significant and 
more efforts to reduce risks are needed.31,112
Wildlife trade
Live animals and animal products are brought into 
close proximity with people in different forms, as part 
of national and international legal and illegal wildlife 
trades—as food, sale items, pets or medicines.112 A mix 
of animal species are traded in markets—wild, captive-
bred, farmed and domesticated—in transport vehicles 
and in market cages. Viruses transmitted to people during 
practices that facilitate the mixing of diverse animal 
species such as in markets have been shown to have 
significantly higher ‘host plasticity’—a taxonomically and 
ecologically diverse host range.113 
The close contact between humans and different species 
of wildlife in the global wildlife trade can facilitate animal-
to-human spillover of new viruses that are capable of 
infecting diverse host species. This can trigger emerging 
disease events with higher pandemic potential because 
these viruses are more likely to amplify via human-to-
human transmission, and thus spread widely.
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Dried Tokay gecko (Gekko gecko) traded for traditional medicine
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Forest destruction and 
disturbance increase human 
exposure to zoonotic disease 
reservoirs. A spillover of 
ebolaviruses to humans is more 
likely to occur in highly disturbed 
forested areas. An analysis of 
large-scale deforestation and 
fragmentation in West and 
Central Africa from 2001 to 2014 
shows that the Ebola virus 
outbreaks along the edge of the 
forest was associated with the loss 
of the dense forests, especially 
those with high canopy cover, 
that happened within the 
previous two years. 
A study of the effect of landscape 
fragmentation in Brazil’s Atlantic 
Forest found that the re- 
emergence of Chagas disease, 
caused by the parasitic protozoan 
Trypanosoma cruzi, was associated 
with reduced mammal diversity 
and increased abundance of 
competent reservoir species, such 
as the common opossum and 
other marsupials. Moreover, T. 
cruzi was found to be more 
prevalent in small mammalian 
species in forest fragments than  
in continuous forest. 
Habitat disturbances can alter the 
dynamics of cross-species 
pathogen transmission.  When 
scientists examined Escherichia 
coli bacteria in humans, livestock 
and wildlife near Kibale National 
Park in Uganda, they found that 
E. coli from humans and livestock 
were genetically more similar to 
those collected from primates 
living in forest fragments, than the 
bacteria from primates living 
nearby in undisturbed forest 
areas. Another study in Bwindi 
Impenetrable National Park also 
found that E. coli from gorillas with 
frequent human contacts were 
genetically similar to E. coli from 
people and livestock.
Encroachment of natural habitats 
brings people into greater contact 
with wildlife, allowing pathogens 
to jump from wildlife hosts to other 
species. The emergence of bat-
associated viruses in Australia 
including Australian bat lyssavirus, 
Hendra virus and Menangle virus is 
linked to agricultural and urban 
development. Bats are sensitive to 
human disturbances. Landscape 
transformation and fragmentation 
reduced feeding and roosting 
habitats of Pteropus sp. fruit bats or 
flying foxes, driving them to search 
for alternative feeding and roosting 
sites in peri-urban landscapes.  
Rodents are associated with more 
than 80 zoonotic diseases. They 
are highly adaptable to habitat 
disturbances. A meta-analysis of 
58 case studies from eight 
countries suggests that land use 
change is more favourable to 
rodent species that harbour 
zoonotic pathogens. Reservoir 
rodents were found to be more 
abundant in modified habitats, 
and more non-reservoir rodents in 
natural habitats. Experiments in a 
savanna system show that rodent 
abundance increased when large 
wildlife— either rodent predators 
or competitors—were removed, 
leading to an increased risk of 
rodent-borne disease.
West Nile virus was introduced to 
the United States in 1999 and is 
now endemic. Wild and 
peri-domestic birds serve as virus 
hosts, and mosquitoes as disease 
vectors. The introduction of the 
exotic virus has substantially 
reduced numbers of native bird 
populations, with some species 
showing no signs of recovery. A 
national-scale study found that 
prevalence of West Nile virus 
infection in vector mosquitos and 
humans increased as bird diversity 
decreased. Bird communities with 
rich diversity tended to be less 
competent pathogen reservoirs.
Land-use change can facilitate 
contact between species that 
usually have little or no prior 
interaction, allowing pathogens to 
cross the species barrier. Nipah 
virus emerged from a large 
intensive pig farm in Ipoh, 
Malaysia, in 1997. Studies suggest 
that Nipah virus spilled over to 
pigs from infected fruit bats 
searching for food in cultivated 
fruit orchards adjacent to the pig 
farm. Infected pigs were then 
sold to other commercial pig 
farms in the south, resulting in 
the 1998-1999 outbreak in pigs 
and piggery workers. 
Changes in the pathogens can 
occur as they evolve to exploit 
new hosts or adapt to changing 
evolutionary pressures. 
Antimicrobial resistance is the 
result of pathogens being exposed 
to antimicrobial drugs and building 
resistance over their short-lived 
generations. Antimicrobials are 
widely used, or misused, in 
veterinary medicine, often as 
preventives. Drug resistance is 
growing in domesticated animals, 
especially in industrialized 
agriculture, and can increase risks 
of disease emergence in livestock 
and humans. 
Zoonotic risks of wildlife use, trade and 
consumption
The potential health risks of harvesting, trading and 
consuming wild meat and of trading live animals are 
discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs. 
Disease transmission can occur through direct contact 
with any of the following: 
1. Hunted and consumed wild animals; 
2. Traded wild animals (including at markets);
3. Wild animals kept as pets or in zoos, sanctuaries or 
laboratories (not covered in this report); and 
4. Domestic animals (covered in Section One).
 
With wild vertebrates being reservoirs of a large repertoire 
of zoonotic pathogens, wild meat harvesting and trade 
in live animals enhances several pathways of zoonotic 
pathogen spillover. Hunters in many forested regions risk 
disease if injured by an animal during its capture, when
carrying their prey back home, or if they cut themselves 
For references see page 63.
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Forest destruction and 
disturbance increase human 
exposure to zoonotic disease 
reservoirs. A spillover of 
ebolaviruses to humans is more 
likely to occur in highly disturbed 
forested areas. An analysis of 
large-scale deforestation and 
fragmentation in West and 
Central Africa from 2001 to 2014 
shows that the Ebola virus 
outbreaks along the edge of the 
forest was associated with the loss 
of the dense forests, especially 
those with high canopy cover, 
that happened within the 
previous two years. 
A study of the effect of landscape 
fragmentation in Brazil’s Atlantic 
Forest found that the re- 
emergence of Chagas disease, 
caused by the parasitic protozoan 
Trypanosoma cruzi, was associated 
with reduced mammal diversity 
and increased abundance of 
competent reservoir species, such 
as the common opossum and 
other marsupials. Moreover, T. 
cruzi was found to be more 
prevalent in small mammalian 
species in forest fragments than  
in continuous forest. 
Habitat disturbances can alter the 
dynamics of cross-species 
pathogen transmission.  When 
scientists examined Escherichia 
coli bacteria in humans, livestock 
and wildlife near Kibale National 
Park in Uganda, they found that 
E. coli from humans and livestock 
were genetically more similar to 
those collected from primates 
living in forest fragments, than the 
bacteria from primates living 
nearby in undisturbed forest 
areas. Another study in Bwindi 
Impenetrable National Park also 
found that E. coli from gorillas with 
frequent human contacts were 
genetically similar to E. coli from 
people and livestock.
Encroachment of natural habitats 
brings people into greater contact 
with wildlife, allowing pathogens 
to jump from wildlife hosts to other 
species. The emergence of bat-
associated viruses in Australia 
including Australian bat lyssavirus, 
Hendra virus and Menangle virus is 
linked to agricultural and urban 
development. Bats are sensitive to 
human disturbances. Landscape 
transformation and fragmentation 
reduced feeding and roosting 
habitats of Pteropus sp. fruit bats or 
flying foxes, driving them to search 
for alternative feeding and roosting 
sites in peri-urban landscapes.  
Rodents are associated with more 
than 80 zoonotic diseases. They 
are highly adaptable to habitat 
disturbances. A meta-analysis of 
58 case studies from eight 
countries suggests that land use 
change is more favourable to 
rodent species that harbour 
zoonotic pathogens. Reservoir 
rodents were found to be more 
abundant in modified habitats, 
and more non-reservoir rodents in 
natural habitats. Experiments in a 
savanna system show that rodent 
abundance increased when large 
wildlife— either rodent predators 
or competitors—were removed, 
leading to an increased risk of 
rodent-borne disease.
West Nile virus was introduced to 
the United States in 1999 and is 
now endemic. Wild and 
peri-domestic birds serve as virus 
hosts, and mosquitoes as disease 
vectors. The introduction of the 
exotic virus has substantially 
reduced numbers of native bird 
populations, with some species 
showing no signs of recovery. A 
national-scale study found that 
prevalence of West Nile virus 
infection in vector mosquitos and 
humans increased as bird diversity 
decreased. Bird communities with 
rich diversity tended to be less 
competent pathogen reservoirs.
Land-use change can facilitate 
contact between species that 
usually have little or no prior 
interaction, allowing pathogens to 
cross the species barrier. Nipah 
virus emerged from a large 
intensive pig farm in Ipoh, 
Malaysia, in 1997. Studies suggest 
that Nipah virus spilled over to 
pigs from infected fruit bats 
searching for food in cultivated 
fruit orchards adjacent to the pig 
farm. Infected pigs were then 
sold to other commercial pig 
farms in the south, resulting in 
the 1998-1999 outbreak in pigs 
and piggery workers. 
Changes in the pathogens can 
occur as they evolve to exploit 
new hosts or adapt to changing 
evolutionary pressures. 
Antimicrobial resistance is the 
result of pathogens being exposed 
to antimicrobial drugs and building 
resistance over their short-lived 
generations. Antimicrobials are 
widely used, or misused, in 
veterinary medicine, often as 
preventives. Drug resistance is 
growing in domesticated animals, 
especially in industrialized 
agriculture, and can increase risks 
of disease emergence in livestock 
and humans. 
when butchering the animal.114 These facilitate the transfer 
of body fluids from the animal to the hunter.115
Investigations into the diversity of human T-lymphotropic 
virus (HTLV) among Central Africans reporting contact 
with non-human primate blood and body fluids through 
hunting and butchering showed that these hunters were 
infected with a wide variety of HTLVs associated with 
many human illnesses.116 A study found simian foamy virus 
infections in Central African hunters and concluded that 
retroviruses can cross into human populations via contact 
when hunting and butchering.117 An extensive survey of 
the prevalence and genetic diversity of SIVs in primate 
wild meat provides insights into the risk for potential new 
cross-species transmissions.118
It is noteworthy that Ebola in Central Africa was spread 
among hunters opportunistically harvesting and handling 
infected gorilla and chimpanzee cadavers for meat 
consumption.119 While there is a risk in consuming wild 
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meat without applying minimum hygiene rules, this is 
not the only factor. The biggest Ebola outbreaks in West 
Africa and now Eastern DR Congo are about secondary 
epidemiological cycles, which underscores the fact that 
human conditions and actions, not “chance spillovers,” are 
the central factor in zoonotic disease transmission. In low-
density and widely dispersed human communities, Ebola 
was a sporadic, low-impact (if distressing) disease of little 
socio-economic consequence until it found its way into 
urban spaces with their dense, and densely connected, 
human populations.
Video: Hotbed of Disease
Video Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9kGH7iC-7TQ | 
© Frontline PBS 
Bwindi Impenetrable National Park, Uganda
The pathogen transmission pathway from a wild animal 
to a human—starting with a small number of rural 
hunters and moving to large numbers of wild-meat 
consumers, in both rural and urban areas, is an important 
factor.112,120 Recent studies conducted in the western part 
of the Serengeti, in Tanzania, showed that regardless of 
the wildlife species, the samples of wild meat screened 
had DNA signatures of potentially dangerous zoonotic 
pathogens such as Bacillus, Brucella and Coxiella spp.121
The meat samples screened were from the highly 
preferred large mammals such as buffalo, wildebeest, 
eland, gazelle, giraffe, warthog and zebra, as well as 
porcupine. Infections from such endemic pathogens 
generally do not develop into epidemics, but such 
infections can be used to identify risk pathways that 
could be used by pathogens of higher consequence.
A risk assessment of zoonotic disease in markets in 
Cambodia found that the combination of high wildlife 
volumes, high-risk taxa for zoonoses and poor biosafety 
increases the potential for pathogen presence and 
transmission.122 In North America, several studies have 
documented the potential disease transmission pathway 
associated with the import of live animals in trade.120,123 
The first reported occurrence of monkeypox outside 
Africa, in 2003, was due to human infection by pet prairie 
dogs that had become infected by African rodents 
imported to the US.124 In 2017, an outbreak of Salmonella 
Agbeni infections was linked to pet turtles.125
Photo credit: Travel Stock/Shutterstock.com
Photo credit: Buhairi Nawawi / Shutterstock.com 
Camels at the camel sales market in Cairo, Egypt
Section III | Understanding the linkages between habitat loss, the trade and use of wildlife, and the emergence of novel zoonoses 37
Preventing the next pandemic: 
Zoonotic diseases and how to break the chain of transmission
Animal and environmental indicators can provide a valuable tool for disease early warning systems:
Monitoring microbial diversity in wildlife, either in a given region or certain species, can be a good indicator 
for detecting potential disease outbreaks, particularly for coronaviruses, filoviruses and paramyxoviruses. 
Consistent monitoring of wildlife morbidity or mortality events can also provide indicators of active 
circulation of disease or outbreaks. For example, an investigation of dead howler monkeys found near a 
wildlife sanctuary in Bolivia led to the detection of yellow fever virus. This provided vital alert information 
and activation of vaccination campaigns to prevent human cases.126 
Sentinel surveillance approaches that select a smaller and targeted group of health workers to gather data 
have been utilized effectively to get ahead of potential spillover events for the detection of West Nile virus 
in birds and equids, Ebola virus in great apes, and monkeypox in chimpanzees in Cameroon. 
Targeted environmental indicators may also be useful for forecasting risk alerts. Examples have included 
prolonged periods of rainfall, which are associated with elevated risk of Rift Valley fever outbreaks in some 
regions, or flooding events, which are associated with leptospirosis. As certain species are known to serve as 
hosts or transmitters of zoonotic diseases, monitoring species distribution can offer important indications 
of potential risks to human health. For example, a change in species range or introduction of invasive 
species that has the potential to serve as a host can signal potential risks. Consistent monitoring and 
sharing of this information among wildlife, livestock and human health agencies is important to improve 
risk assessment and prevention for zoonotic disease threats.
Early warning systems and monitoring wildlife 
Photo credit: US National Park Service/Hannah Schwalbe
There are other examples of zoonotic diseases known 
to be transmitted by aquatic animals. If left untreated, 
zoonoses transmitted from seals, whales and other marine 
mammals that rely on marine ecosystems can induce 
life-threatening systemic diseases that could pose public 
health risks. Consumption of raw or undercooked meat 
from pinniped (seal, walrus) or cetacean (whale, dolphin, 
porpoise) mammals has caused serious bacterial (e.g. 
salmonellosis and botulism) and parasitic (trichinellosis and 
toxoplasmosis) diseases in humans.96
While this section focuses on the direct risks of zoonotic 
disease transmission faced by humans in contact with 
wild animals, there are also significant secondary impacts 
to such wild animal-human interactions. As noted at the 
beginning of this section, where wild animal trade is 
unsustainable and wildlife populations are significantly 
reduced or made locally extinct, that ecosystem loses 
not only its biodiversity but also a protective “biodiverse 
buffer” against the emergence and spread of novel 
zoonotic diseases.
Bat research at Joshua Tree National Park in California, United States
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This section sets out the One Health approach as the 
most promising way to manage and prevent zoonoses; 
it also gives examples of its past successes and discusses 
some of the potential barriers to a wider uptake. Lessons 
from managing previous zoonotic outbreaks, including 
pandemics, are shared and discussed.
The One Health approach to controlling 
zoonoses
Humanity’s experience in public health over the past 
centuries allows us to draw some broad lessons about 
effective management of zoonoses. As explained earlier 
in this report, the One Health approach can be defined as 
the collaborative effort across multiple disciplines to attain 
optimal health for people, animals and the environment. 
This approach has emerged as a key tool for preventing 
and managing diseases occurring at the interface of 
human, animal and environment health. At the same time, 
a closely related approach, known as “EcoHealth” has been 
defined as a set of systemic, participatory approaches 
necessary to understanding and promoting both health 
and well-being in the context of social and ecological 
interactions. Both the One Health and EcoHealth 
approaches emphasize multidisciplinary collaboration for 
holistic interventions that attain not only human health 
goals but also animal and environment health targets, the 
latter two of which are central to improving the control 
of neglected and emerging infectious diseases, many of 
which are zoonoses.127
Though both One Health and EcoHealth approaches 
sit at the nexus of human, animal and environmental 
interactions, they have subtle differences: One Health, as 
generally practiced, emphasizes biomedical animal and 
human health, while EcoHealth pays more attention to 
the broader relations between health and ecosystems, 
focusing on the environment and related socio-economic 
systems.128 A third concept, “Planetary Health,” focuses 
on human health in relation to global sustainability.129 
As none of these terms has an agreed or standardized 
definition, and given their convergence and similarities130, 
this assessment report adopts One Health as the umbrella 
term, as it can be most easily understood by decision-
makers and the general public.
As we have seen, zoonotic diseases involve and affect 
human health, animal health and environment health. 
Section Four
Managing and preventing zoonoses: 
How One Health can help
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The pathogens originate in animals, and the emergence 
or spillover of the diseases they cause in humans is usually 
the result of human actions, such as intensifying livestock 
production or degrading and fragmenting ecosystems, 
or exploiting wildlife unsustainably (see Sections One 
and Three). As such, their management should be inter-
sectoral. At the global level, three intergovernmental 
organisations, from different sectors, have specific 
mandates that address zoonotic diseases: the World 
Health Organization (WHO), the World Organisation 
for Animal Health (OIE), and the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO).
In response to the bird flu (HPAI) pandemic, these three 
intergovernmental organisations along with UNICEF, the 
United Nations System Influenza Coordination (UNSIC), 
and the World Bank developed a strategic framework 
for reducing the risks of emerging zoonoses.131 This 
framework has five strategic elements that remain 
relevant today:
1. Build robust and well-governed public and animal 
health systems compliant with the WHO International 
Health Regulations (the amendment entered into 
force in July 2016) and OIE international standards 
through the pursuit of long-term interventions. 
2. Prevent regional and international crises by 
controlling disease outbreaks through improved 
One Health
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national and international emergency response 
capabilities.
3. Promote wide-ranging collaboration across sectors 
and disciplines.
4. Develop rational and targeted disease control 
programmes through the conduct of strategic 
research.
5. Better address concerns of the poor by shifting the 
focus from developed to developing economies, 
from potential to actual disease problems, and 
through a focus on the drivers of a broader range of 
locally important diseases.
In 2010, FAO, OIE and WHO started collaborative work to 
address risks at the human-animal-ecosystems interface 
as described in the FAO/OIE/WHO Tripartite Concept 
Note.132 In 2019, they updated their joint 2008 tripartite 
guide on zoonoses and other One Health issues. Other 
intergovernmental organisations also have interests in 
environment, animal and human health, notably the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), some 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and the 
World Bank. The Convention on Biological Diversity has 
developed Biodiversity-inclusive One Health Guidance.133 
And there are many other organisations, institutes, 
programmes, government agencies and nongovernmental 
organisations working in this space. CGIAR, for example, is 
the world’s largest global agricultural innovation network; 
one of CGIAR’s constituent centres, the International 
Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), has programmes 
working on livestock and human health and sustainable 
livestock systems.
In general, environment health initiatives have been less 
well represented than animal, livestock and human health 
initiatives in global zoonoses prevention and control 
programmes. But the environment is key to the emerging 
One Health approaches that are spearheading zoonoses 
risk reduction and control at regional and national 
levels. Applying these multi-sector approaches has had 
Environmental health practitioners in Uganda have significantly helped to reduce sickness and deaths 
caused by zoonotic disease outbreaks such as Ebola. These practitioners work at the frontlines of disease 









In short, Uganda’s environmental health practitioners are the very embodiment of the One Health approach 
to healthy people, animals and the environment. To stop disease outbreaks in the future, Uganda will be 
relying on this remarkable group of “environmental health activists” to advise on, plan, implement, manage 
and monitor the country’s many One Health activities.134
Role of environmental health and its practitioners in Uganda’s One Health programmes
Photo credit: Black Sheep Media / Shutterstock.com
A butcher shop in Kampala, Uganda
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months just to confirm that Ebola was the cause of many 
severe illnesses and untimely deaths in the region, and by 
then large numbers of people were already infected. War, 
population growth, poverty, suboptimal communications 
and community engagement, and poor health infra-
structure all likely contributed to the unprecedented 
spread, duration and size of the epidemic.136 Even when 
individual epidemics are successfully declared over, the 
threat of recurring spillover events will remain as long as a 
strategy to address disease risks at their source is lacking: 
Since Ebola viruses were first detected in 1976, there have 
been approximately 30 known outbreaks.
With rapidly advancing information and communication 
technologies, a surge in novel surveillance and reporting 
tools is drawing on a wide range of field reports. These 
tools include the Program for Monitoring Emerging 
Diseases (ProMed), GeoChat, the Global Early Warning 
System for Major Animal Disease Including Zoonoses 
(GLEWS), the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network 
(GOARN), the World Animal Health Information Database 
(OIE/WAHIS) and Interface (currently being updated), 
the Emergency Prevention System for Animal Health 
(EMPRES-AH), and HealthMap. Although wildlife diseases 
are included in several of these systems, wildlife disease 
monitoring and reporting remains highly limited at 
global and national scales. There is a need for information 
systems for wildlife disease and pathogen surveillance 
information, paired with effective connections to public 
health and domestic animal health systems to ensure 
effective coordination and timely use of information.
Advances in biotechnology and molecular epidemiology 
have made it much easier to develop diagnostics that can 
identify and track the transmission of zoonoses as well as 
support the development of vaccines and therapeutics.137 
Another noteworthy trend is the democratization of 
disease control. Increasing participation in zoonotic 
disease control from an increasingly wide range of 
people—including “community animal health workers” 
and “citizen scientists”—has introduced new perspectives 
and agendas to the disease control community, such as 
ensuring animal welfare and assessing the impacts of both 
disease and disease control programmes on women and 
poor farmers.
For example, gender plays a significant role in shaping 
both infectious disease outbreaks and our responses to 
control them. Biological, economic, cultural and political 
factors influence how men and women are affected by, 
and are made vulnerable to, diseases and related health 
risks.138 Women in particular tend to be more vulnerable 
than men to disease outbreaks, including zoonoses 
(though COVID-19 may be an exception). In Liberia, for 
instance, the government reported that 75 per cent of 
epidemic victims were women, as they are more often 
than not at the forefront of human-animal interactions.139
some notable successes, such as in controlling rabies in 
the Serengeti ecosystem in Tanzania; understanding the 
human and animal burden of brucellosis in Mongolia; 
elucidating the transmission dynamics of Rift Valley fever 
and forecasting its outbreaks; and building capacity in One 
Health disease control in Southeast Asia.135
Track record in managing zoonoses
There have been many cases of successful management of 
endemic zoonotic diseases. Several developed countries 
have succeeded in reducing zoonotic foodborne diseases 
over relatively short periods by instituting control 
mechanisms all along the food value chain, with an 
emphasis on reducing disease in the animal host.
Similarly, many campaigns have managed to reduce 
endemic zoonoses such as pig tapeworm and rabies. For 
example, preventable epilepsy in humans caused by 
the parasitic pig tapeworm, which is ingested by people 
consuming pork in Madagascar, is being effectively 
controlled by combining a roll-out of anti-worm 
medication and educational campaigns. It is important to 
emphasize that such successes in disease control need to 
be sustained: If the control measures are not maintained, 
the diseases will recur after an initial suppression. For 
this reason, several high-priority zoonoses have been 
targeted for “progressive control towards elimination” 
(where possible), including HPAI, pig tapeworm and 
rabies. Much progress has been made in reducing or even 
eliminating zoonoses from richer countries; considerable 
achievements have been made in less wealthy countries 
as well. In Bangladesh, for example, a canine rabies 
elimination programme has focused on dog bite 
management and mass dog vaccination since 2011; as a 
result, human rabies deaths in the country have been cut 
in half.
The track record in managing emerging zoonoses is much 
more mixed. The rapid containment of SARS is considered 
to be one of the biggest success stories in public health 
in recent years. In 2003, the WHO alerted the world that 
a severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) of unknown 
cause was rapidly spreading from southern China. Within 
six months, this entirely new disease had been identified 
as a coronavirus, with its transmission and risk factors 
elucidated, treatments developed and the disease 
spread stopped.
The more recent Ebola epidemic in West Africa, however, 
shows how difficult it can be to control a zoonotic 
outbreak. The 2013–2016 Ebola outbreak at the 
intersection of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone affected 
some of the world’s poorest and least developed countries. 
The outbreak grew larger than all previous outbreaks 
combined, with the virus reportedly infecting 28,646 
people and killing 11,323 of them. It took more than three 
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Recognizing the instrumental role women could play in 
controlling disease outbreaks, there has been a series 
of “Women and One Health Workshops” highlighting 
the pressing need for a more inclusive and gender-
sensitive approach to One Health policies, particularly in 
a developing-country context.139 These workshops aim to 
build a foundation for effective policies addressing gender 
inequalities that so often underlie zoonotic-disease-
related risk factors.
While few would argue against setting up programmes to 
respond to zoonotic outbreaks, there are concerns that, 
first, our responses may end up costing more than the 
diseases themselves, and, second, that these costs may be 
borne disproportionately by the world’s poorest people.
During the bird flu pandemic, which started in 1997, there 
were several attempts to “restructure” the poultry industry, 
which in effect meant discouraging poor “backyard” 
poultry farmers, many of whom were women with few 
other ways to generate an income.141 And a recent study 
in Egypt found that large-scale culling of poultry in 
response to an outbreak of bird flu (HPAI) was associated 
with an increase in childhood malnutrition.142 Likewise, 
bans on wildlife trade, while sometimes successful, have 
in other cases led to unintended consequences, such 
as when a ban on polar bear products impoverished 
livelihoods in indigenous Arctic communities and reduced 
the communities’ tolerance for polar bears near their 
communities and participation in shared management 
initiatives.143 Response measures inappropriately targeting 
wildlife—such as poisoning or depopulation efforts—
may threaten biodiversity and ecosystem services. These 
lessons reinforce the notion that interventions must 
weigh possible benefits with potential trade-offs; such an 
approach can help to optimize resource use and ensure 
equitable solutions.
Lessons from managing previous 
coronavirus outbreaks
Because we are in the midst of an ongoing pandemic, it 
will require some time before clear conclusions can be 
drawn on the best ways to manage COVID-19. Already, 
we can see the need for rapid learning, uptake of good 
practices such as real-time surveillance data, and global 
solidarity around resources. However, lessons learned from 
previous coronavirus epidemics and pandemics in animals 
and people suggest the following.
Like all viruses, over time, coronaviruses mutate into new 
strains possessing different degrees of pathogenicity 
(the ability to invade and cause disease within the host), 
virulence (severity of the disease in infected hosts) 
and infectiousness (capability of being transmitted). 
Coronaviruses have a slower mutation rate than some 
other RNA viruses, which means that once an effective 
vaccine is produced, it will likely provide protection 
against the virus for much longer than, say, that provided 
by today’s annual influenza vaccines.
One Health approach—What can we learn from past zoonotic disease outbreaks?
Given that COVID-19 is only one of a series of emerging zoonoses, the experiences of the past can inform 
strategies for the future. Overall efforts to strengthen systems for prevention, detection and response 
to emerging infectious diseases in Asia have had mixed results. Significant investment has been made 
by development partners and developing countries following the epidemic of highly pathogenic avian 
influenza virus of type A and subtype H5N1 (HPAI [H5N1]) in 2004. Surveillance and diagnostic capacity have 
been built but HPAI remains endemic in key countries across much of Southeast Asia and in Egypt. Efforts 
to strengthen capacity in Africa to detect and manage pandemic threats have only just started and services 
lag behind Asia. The One Health approach has been advocated by many, but its uptake and institutional 
support is uneven. More investment and support is required before such approaches can be implemented 
routinely. In addition, a standardized set of metrics to measure the effectiveness of One Health interventions 
may also help to increase uptake of the approach.140
Photo credit: ILRI/Stevie Mann
Chickens sold at the Ganeshguru livestock market, Guwahati, India
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It has been difficult, however, to develop effective vaccines 
against livestock coronavirus-caused diseases of high 
economic cost. Because outbreaks of novel coronavirus 
diseases occur fairly regularly—as noted, six recent global 
coronavirus outbreaks have all spread widely, affecting 
several continents—coronaviruses should have higher 
priority among the viruses that need study and surveillance.
Previous coronavirus outbreaks have entailed enormous 
financial costs and social disruption. The human health 
burden of zoonotic coronaviruses has been relatively low, 
but with the potential to be much higher. Risk assessment, 
mitigation and communication must be improved. And 
in many countries, most of the direct and indirect burden 
of disease control has fallen on the poorest, indicating 
a pressing need to provide people with better social 
protection and increased resilience to disease.
Compared with the SARS epidemic, both the scientific 
and public health responses to COVID-19 have been 
communicated differently, but incentives for countries 
to declare outbreaks early remain weak, especially in 
developing and emerging economies. That needs to 
change in order to facilitate both global readiness and 
effective international collaboration.
The economic impacts of COVID-19 by June 2020 appear 
to be many times worse than those of previous known 
coronavirus outbreaks. The economic losses linked to an 
outbreak include both direct and indirect losses. When 
pandemics have a relatively low population mortality rate 
(perhaps much less than 10 per cent as appears to be the 
case of COVID-19), the indirect costs of the pandemic tend 
to be much higher than the direct costs. These indirect 
costs include loss of jobs, disrupted food supply chains, 
border closings, restricted mobility, restricted tourism, 
reduced education opportunities, business closures/
bankruptcies, a rise in fatalities because health services 
are overwhelmed or people avoid them, and many 
other complex downstream effects. Many ongoing and 
proposed actions are addressing these costs but they are 
not within the remit of this paper.
Control of coronavirus and other zoonotic infections in 
farmed domestic animals, farmed and captured wildlife 
and companion animals is difficult in all countries and 
perhaps impossible in many developing countries. The 
best veterinary practice requires combined applications 
of vaccines, biosecurity protocols, movement controls and 
husbandry management, all of which are very difficult to 
implement in poorer countries. Because vaccines used for 
porcine epidemic diarrhoea are not always effective, strict 
biosecurity is the most effective measure to prevent the 
introduction and spread of the virus. This has almost never 
been successfully applied to smallholder farms supplying 
mass domestic markets. Vaccines are also unsatisfactory 
in preventing infectious bronchitis in chickens and 
feline infectious peritonitis. Infectious bronchitis and 
porcine epidemic diarrhoea have been better controlled 
in Europe than in China but remain global pandemics. 
Coronaviruses that are well-adapted to their hosts are 
difficult to eradicate.
While SARS appears to be eliminated, MERS continues to 
cause human deaths, because the virus still circulates in 
the intermediate host (dromedary camels). Vaccines were 
initiated for SARS but did not progress beyond phase-one 
human trials. Vaccines are currently under development 
for MERS but not yet approved. A race is now on among 
the large private pharmaceutical companies, academic 
units and small biotech companies to develop a vaccine 
for COVID-19. More than one hundred companies are 
involved in this work, but there remain real challenges, 
not only to developing an effective vaccine for this novel 
coronavirus, but also for quickly mass-producing it in 
sufficient quantities, and ensuring that it is available to 
all regardless of income, to protect every one of the 
7.8 billion people living today on planet Earth.
Video: WAHIS: Protecting animals, 
preserving our future




Effective control of zoonotic diseases requires early detection and 
accurate diagnosis at the animal source. Disease surveillance in 
animals is critical for preventing the spread of disease between 
animal populations, and minimizing the risk of transmission 
to human populations. The cost of disease control increases 

















Source: World Bank (2012)
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This final section looks at additional policy and practice 
responses that can help prevent the inevitable next 
emerging zoonosis to appear on the horizon. Again, it 
focuses on the One Health approach as the preferred 
framework for zoonoses risk reduction and control and 
discusses how this could add value to attempts to mitigate 
the seven anthropogenic drivers of zoonoses emergence 
identified in Section One. It makes ten concrete, One-
Health-based recommendations that could address the 
underlying causes, while also supporting a more effective, 
coordinated response to future pandemics.
One Health aspects of zoonoses control and 
prevention
Controlling and preventing zoonotic outbreaks requires 
coordinated interdisciplinary responses across human, 
animal and environment health. Our responses to both 
controlling the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and to 
reducing the risk of future zoonotic disease outbreaks must 
address a range of areas. 
In the immediate crisis, a public health response must be 
mounted, financed and managed. Maintaining the global 
food system is a top priority, as is providing additional 
social protection for poor, vulnerable and marginalized 
populations. A clear exit strategy from pandemic responses 
is needed, as are sustainable ways of re-building damaged 
economies while not sacrificing long-term social and 
environmental achievements. There are many reports, 
guidelines and suggestions addressing these issues. This 
report, and this section in particular, takes a broader view 
and recommends ways to prevent and mitigate the risks 
posed by zoonotic diseases, with a particular focus on 
animal and environment health aspects. It will be critical to 
incorporate these aspects in short-term recovery packages, 
as well as in longer-term policy and development planning.
As noted, zoonoses are complex; responsibility for their 
prevention and control falls across several sectors—
environment, agriculture, health, trade and commerce. 
Approaches to dealing with these diseases to date have 
been inadequately coordinated across these multiple 
dimensions.144 Institutionally speaking, zoonoses can find 
themselves outside conventional health fields (falling 
between different siloed sectors of human and veterinary 
health) and, in the worst cases, ignored. One Health 
thinking and research offers an approach to break down 
traditional sectoral barriers to achieve effective control of 
zoonoses. A promising development in the wake of the 
bird flu pandemic is the establishment of joint zoonoses 
working groups in many countries and other international 
collaborations.145
Successful control of zoonoses requires strong policy 
frameworks and judicious legal mechanisms to 
accompany policy frameworks. It also demands well-
functioning institutions that have adequate capacity, 
adequate financing and a clear plan for implementing 
interventions.
In the case of emerging diseases, up-front investments 
in surveillance and in coordinated human, animal and 
environment health services are needed to ensure that 
‘emergence events’ do not turn into full-scale epidemics, 
or pandemics. In economic terms, the World Bank 
estimated eight years ago that an annual investment of 
USD3.4 billion in animal health systems worldwide would 
avert losses incurred through delayed or inadequate 
responses to zoonoses—losses estimated at almost 
double the preventative investment.10 The loss of human 
life, and economic and social costs of the COVID-19 
crisis clearly indicate the value—and the necessity—
of increased investment in surveillance, prevention 
measures and coordinated cross-sectoral early response 
to ensure we do everything possible to prevent this from 
happening again.
Section Five
Preventing future zoonotic pandemics:
What more could be done?
V
          Video: What is One Health?
Video Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kfluP-tFC2k | 
© Simpleshow foundation
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Improved interdisciplinary science will help to inform 
the prevention and control of zoonotic diseases. It is 
important not to study pathogens in isolation, but rather 
to better understand how human social behaviour 
impacts the natural world, as well as the emergence and 
spread of disease.146 These relations are non-linear and 
involve complex systemic relationships that must be 
factored into both research and effective decision-making.
Success will require addressing the root causes and 
drivers of disease emergence, which in turn will require 
changing our behaviour and our actions in relation to 
ecosystems. While some of the basic ecological factors 
of disease emergence are known, these factors need to 
be integrated fully into country-level surveillance and 
response programmes with relevant expertise included in 
inter-sectoral teams.
Many zoonotic diseases can occur along with other 
infectious diseases within a given environment or 
host.147 This can complicate disease management if each 
pathogen requires a different measure to control it. It is 
also critical to understand these interactions and identify 
opportunities to control multiple pathogens or vectors 
with a single intervention. 
Addressing the anthropogenic drivers of 
zoonoses emergence
A major constraint to moving towards a pandemic-
free world is that most efforts to control infectious 
diseases are still reactive rather than proactive. During 
any disease crisis, much effort is spent in developing 
immediate responses. However, much less investment 
is made in building communities’ resilience to future 
outbreaks and, even more importantly, in addressing the 
underlying structural problems or drivers that are causing 
the recurrence of animal and human epidemics and 
pandemics. 
Our present crisis in 2020 provides us with an opportunity 
to “build back better.” Collectively, we need to shift from 
short-term political responses to long-term political 
commitments to secure human, animal and environment 
health. Sustaining all life on Earth depends on it.
The following table returns to the anthropogenic drivers 
identified in Sections One and Three and gives examples 
of possible actions, both general and One Health-oriented, 
that could address these in a successful way.
Many of these seven drivers have shared underlying 
causes. For example, the growing demand for food 
can cause agricultural systems to intensify, and pay 
insufficient attention to important consequences related 
to environmental and human health,148 changes to food 
value chains, and increased utilization of wildlife. 
The COVID-19 crisis has highlighted vulnerabilities 
in the current global food system. These range from 
strains on local, regional and global supply chains 
due to “lockdowns,” to very specific problems, such as 
Photo credit: The Escape of Malee / Shutterstock.com
Commuters wearing masks during the COVID-19 pandemic in Bangkok, Thailand
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disruption in crop production that have occurred due to 
interruptions in the transport of commercial beehives 
to supply critical pollination services.149 Many local food 
markets have been forced to close because of perceived 
high risks of COVID-19 due to the density of people and 
animal products and low abilities to enforce hygiene and 
social distancing measures. These market closures have 
increased food insecurity, according to the International 
Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems (April 2020).
Increased support is necessary to build resilient 
agroecological food systems that rely on natural synergies 
and harness biological diversity for food production while 
protecting important wildlife habitats. This is needed not 
only to decrease the risks of potential zoonotic outbreaks 
but also to build resilience in human communities to 
withstand the impacts of zoonotic outbreaks. Investments 
in local supply chains, including strengthening local 
abilities to meet food safety regulations, are also part of 
the necessary transformation to sustainable food systems. 
Lastly, a farm-to-fork approach must be taken with regards 
to reducing risk from zoonotic diseases along the entire 
consumptive chain, from production to processing, and 
transport to consumption of food. Many of these issues 
are examined in more depth later in this section.
Strengthening the environment 
dimensions of the One Health approach
All seven anthropogenic drivers of zoonotic disease listed 
above have a strong environmental dimension. However, 
environmental science, scientists and practitioners as 
well as environmental policies have been inadequately 
incorporated in the One Health approach, while 
environmental considerations have been insufficiently 
mainstreamed in its development and implementation. 
These oversights have significantly limited the success of 
the One Health approach to date.3 
Moving forward, we must further invest in understanding 
the underlying environmental links with infectious 
zoonotic diseases and the emergence of those diseases. 
We must work to monitor zoonotic disease in human-
dominated environments (where live animals may be 
sold), in areas where human settlements are encroaching 
on wildlife habitats, as well as in intact ecosystems that 
are home to important wildlife species. Such work will 
help us to establish essential baselines. We also need to 
investigate how the transformation and degradation of 
habitats—whether due to urbanization, risk-averse fire 
policies, inappropriate agriculture or other development, 
restoration or re-wilding of areas, or other forms of 
environmental change and degradation—are affecting 
the emergence of diseases. A deeper understanding of 
how existing stressors, including pollution and climate 
change, exacerbate risks and impacts from zoonotic 
disease is also warranted. In particular, we must further 
strengthen research capacity-building, and further 
investigate the links between wildlife exploitation, 
zoonotic disease emergence, and the potential risk of an 
epidemic or pandemic.
An example of studying the complex relationship 
between biodiversity and infectious disease outbreaks is 
provided by the Great Apes Survival Partnership (GRASP) 
programme. Working with conservation partners and 
through implementation at the level of local communities, 
for instance, this programme developed protocols to 
monitor human and wildlife health in the Republic of 
Congo. Results from this project led to recommendations 
for African great ape range states.150 This technical 
approach could be replicated in other regions to monitor 
the outbreak and spread of human and wildlife diseases at 
different stages of habitat alteration and identify hotspots 
where interventions aiming to reverse or halt natural and 
biodiversity losses are required. 
Leveraging innovations and new 
technologies
Without more fundamental knowledge of pathogen 
epidemiology and more rapid and inexpensive 
genome sequencing, every new serious emerging 
disease will continue to take us by surprise. However, 
additional investments in new technologies, particularly 
biotechnologies and information and communication 
technologies, could stimulate the innovation of “game-
changers” in disease surveillance, rapid response and 
control. 
Specific improvements in biosecurity are critical for 
detecting, preventing and controlling zoonotic disease 
outbreaks, and for implementing rapid and adequate 
emergency responses. These include preventive measures 
designed to reduce risk of infectious disease transmission 
Video: Controlling zoonotic diseases through a 
One Health approach preserving our future
Photo credit: ILRI/Stevie Mann
A farmer and her pigs in Tete province, Mozambique
Video Link: https://youtu.be/RL0izxaUoMk | © ILRI
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in crops, livestock, quarantined pests, invasive alien 
species and living modified organisms. While several 
studies found that biosecurity advice and policy are often 
sound, there is limited implementation of biosecurity 
measures, especially among small-scale livestock keepers, 
due to a lack of resources and incentives. 
Some impediments to implementing biosecurity 
interventions include a lack of awareness in farmers 
of the risk and the cost and convenience of protective 
measures.151,152 A study in Uganda found that even 
though implementing biosecurity practices would reduce 
losses from African swine fever, it would also reduce 
farmer profit margins by 6 per cent per year.153 We need 
new approaches that rely more on incentives, systemic 
understanding, and equitable sharing of risk.
However, while innovation is key to pandemic solutions, 
improved biosecurity is also needed in laboratories 
that research emerging infectious diseases. While 
there is no evidence that this played any role in the 
COVID-19 pandemic, there are many documented 
incidences of laboratory-acquired infections and even 
accidental escapes of highly pathogenic organisms from 
laboratories.154,155
 
Responding to public and policy demand 
for the prevention and control of zoonoses
While further research and innovation are critical, a 
number of effective strategies to control neglected 
zoonoses have already been identified. A main barrier to 
the wide uptake of these strategies is a lack of investment 
in disease control, particularly in developing countries. 
The costs of preventing or controlling a zoonotic disease 
can seem high when compared to the direct public health 
benefits of such actions.
However, the costs of prevention are easily outweighed 
by the benefits. This becomes evident when a full analysis 
of the social, economic and ecological consequences of a 
potential outbreak across multiple sectors is undertaken, 
including losses of livestock, wildlife, tourism, forestry, 
trade, employment and other areas.156 COVID-19 has 
made this clear.
Effective policy responses to mitigate threats from 
zoonotic diseases require concerted policy action to stem 
the multiple drivers of their emergence, which include 
habitat loss and degradation, overexploitation of wildlife, 
and land-use changes, among other factors. This will 
be particularly important in cases where fragmented 
habitats are thought to play a role in stimulating rapid 
evolutionary processes and diversification of diseases. 
These land-use change and habitat-associated policy 
responses must be considered in the context of potential 
climate change risks. This is especially important for any 
policies aiming to mitigate risk from pathogens that 
spend part of their life cycle outside of their hosts, as is 
the case for vector-borne diseases, which have proven to 
be more climate sensitive.157 
Transforming and re-governing food 
systems
Preventing future zoonotic disease outbreaks also 
requires improvements in policy, regulation and 
monitoring of traditional food markets. Millions of people 
depend on informal food markets that occur in public 
spaces where small-scale retailers come together to sell 
fresh produce, fish and meat from domesticated animals, 
and in some cases, from wild animals. While many recent 
zoonotic pandemics originated in wildlife,158 a similarly 
large number originated in livestock. To reduce risks 
of future zoonotic diseases, meat from both wild and 
domesticated origin—and the places in which the meat 
is sold—should be subject to similarly strict sanitary 
standards. 
Video: FAO: Changing disease landscapes - 
Towards a Global Health approach
Video Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vHVSW5HwmZM | 
© FAO
Dissecting infected ticks in ILRI’s Tick Laboratory
Photo credit: © ILRI / David White
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Clinical relevance of disease ecology
(A) Transmission of infection and amplification in people (bright red) occurs after a pathogen from wild animals (pink) moves into livestock to 
cause an outbreak (light green) that amplifies the capacity for pathogen transmission to people. (B) Early detection and control efforts reduce 
disease incidence in people (light blue) and animals (dark green). Spillover arrows shows cross-species transmission.167
Source: Reprinted from The Lancet, Vol.380, Karesh et al., Ecology of zoonoses: natural and unnatural histories, Page 1942, Copyright (2012), with permission from Elsevier.
Furthermore, strengthened sanitary regulations must 
go beyond public food markets and include the entire 
supply chain for domesticated and wild meat, including 
both farmed and captured wildlife. Better enforcement of 
these standards is absolutely essential to reduce risk. WHO 
has developed guidelines for healthy food markets.159 
Adoption of animal welfare standards for the care, housing 
and transport of live animals along the entire supply 
chain is also needed to reduce risk of zoonotic disease 
transmission.160 Additional restrictions on which species 
can be legally sold should also be considered, as is being 
done in Asia in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis. Additional 
options for reducing risk, including bans on the highest-
risk markets, must also be considered if there is evidence 
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Any consideration of additional regulations on 
informal markets, including those involving legally 
consumed wild meat, must consider social equity 
and human vulnerability. Some populations may be 
disproportionately dependent on these sources of protein 
to meet their food security needs.
Sustainable use of wild resources and 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements
Sustainable use of biodiversity or wild natural resources 
—a critical component of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD)—includes non-consumptive uses of 
wildlife, such as sustainable tourism and wildlife viewing, 
as well as consumptive uses. Consumption, handling and 
trading  of wildlife—including for food, pets, zoos and 
medical research—can be a factor in the transmission of 
zoonotic diseases. 
The Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) addresses 
the conservation and management of migratory species 
that are endangered or whose conservation status is 
unfavourable, and the taking and use of such species. It 
established an expert group on wildlife diseases in 2005.   
Sustainable use is central to the economic and social 
sustainability of wildlife and its habitats. The Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora (CITES) has established a non-detriment 
finding mechanism to ensure that international trade in 
wildlife is biologically sustainable. Additional measures 
to ensure safety for human health components as part 
of trade regulations, and improved application of all 
these measures at national levels, would benefit zoonotic 
disease control.
Demand management for consumption of wildlife, and 
associated policies to incentivize such shifts in demand, 
have been indicated as a possible and appropriate 
response to reduce zoonotic risk. Demand management 
interventions are most successful when they are based on 
a clear understanding of the social, economic and cultural 
aspects of wild meat consumption along the entire value 
chain, from producer (or hunter) to consumer.107 Demand 
management measures should be put in place as part of a 
comprehensive package of policies and interventions that 
address all aspects of human, animal and environment 
health. The human and animal dimensions of health 
include disease transmission aspects but also nutrition, 
welfare and food security components. In cases where 
human nutrition and livelihoods are dependent on the 
consumption and/or trade in wild meat or live animals, 
careful consideration must be given to viable alternatives, 
particularly for poor or marginalized people. This becomes 
even more critical when bans of wild meat or live animal 
marketing are being considered. Expansion of diversified 
income sources is often an essential component to shift 
incentives along the wild meat supply chain to grow 
economic resilience and ensure continued incentives for 
wildlife conservation. Diversification should be based on 
a thorough understanding of the dynamics of the system 
Photo credit: ILRI / Stevie Mann
A villager and her sheep in Fakara, Niger
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and clear business planning for alternative means of 
generating income.170,171 
The Collaborative Partnership on Sustainable Wildlife 
Management describes some of the key factors to ensure 
sustainability of wild meat consumption, including 
careful monitoring of animal populations, strengthened 
tenure and management rights for local populations, 
and provision of technical expertise to support the 
management of animal populations as well as to 
implement stringent sanitary measures for the sale, 
transport and consumption of wild animals and meat. 
Management measures, such as temporary bans to allow 
wildlife population recovery as well as removal of non-
productive animals, may also be effective.
Interventions at the human-livestock 
interface 
Many zoonoses can be best tackled through interventions 
involving the livestock hosts of the disease pathogens.172  
Improved and sustained collaboration between medical, 
veterinary and wildlife authorities is necessary to improve 
surveillance and control of zoonotic diseases. While 
these authorities may come together during a crisis to 
collaborate and share resources, as is the case now where 
many veterinary laboratories are supporting testing for 
the current novel coronavirus, these collaborations are 
not fully institutionalized and often discontinue in non-
crises periods. Intensive livestock production systems 
would benefit from stringent biosecurity and veterinary 
control measures. Extensive livestock production systems, 
including pastoralism, can provide proteins efficiently 
while also providing environmental co-benefits and 
reduced zoonotic disease risk. The control of coronavirus 
and other zoonotic infections in farmed domestic animals, 
captured wild animals and companion animals is difficult 
in many developing countries. This generally requires 
combined applications of vaccines, biosecurity protocols, 
movement controls, slaughter of affected animals and 
quarantine of premises, and husbandry management, 
among other measures.
Towards evidence-informed policy
A stronger evidence base and greater capacity-building 
is needed to understand complex risk profiles and to 
assess the costs, benefits, acceptability and scalability of 
such interventions. In addition, many interventions to 
curb zoonotic disease in animals that were promising in a 
project context have not been taken up by development 
programmes or the public sector. For example, a review of 
different ecosystem and animal interventions to control 
sleeping sickness in five African countries found they 
worked well during the project, but that the disease re-
emerged after the project ended.164 Future efforts must 
ensure that proven preventive measures that mitigate 
zoonotic disease transmission among livestock are 
incorporated in policy frameworks. Disease discriminates, 
with the burden of neglected zoonotic diseases falling 
heaviest on poor, vulnerable and marginalized people.165 
To be effective, zoonoses control programmes must find 
ways to reduce the barriers that disadvantaged groups 
face in managing diseases in the animals they keep, and
in accessing disease control services for themselves and 
their animals.
Key actors in implementing the recommendations of 
this report include research institutions, national and 
local governments, intergovernmental organisations, 
non-governmental organisations and businesses. A 
clear interdisciplinary research agenda on zoonotic 
diseases has been described. The aim of this agenda is 
not only to improve understanding of the human, animal 
Photo credit: StreetVJ / Shutterstock
Commuters at Shinagawa train station in Tokyo, Japan
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and environmental dimensions of health, but also to 
pursue applied research on the socio-economic policy 
dimensions of addressing these factors in integrated 
ways. While many One Health approaches are employed 
by interdisciplinary teams at national levels, it is 
important that the approaches are fully employed at local 
governance levels using the best available science.
Non-governmental organisations provide critical technical 
assistance and multidisciplinary support in rolling out One 
Health approaches. Intergovernmental organisations have 
an important role in the coordination of the response to 
global pandemic threats, including collating information, 
providing guidelines and advice, developing response 
strategies and sharing lessons learned for improved 
preventive actions. WHO works in close collaboration with 
FAO and OIE to promote cross-sectoral collaboration to 
address risks from zoonoses and other public health threats 
at the human-animal-ecosystem interface, and to provide 
guidance on how to reduce these risks. UNEP, the science-
based global environmental authority of the United Nations, 
and the Secretariats of the Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements (MEAs) that it administers, have a clear role 
to play in expanding the environmental dimensions of 
this approach, including strengthening environmental 
laws and their enforcement. Several examples of possible 
entry points have been identified in voluntary guidance on 
biodiversity-inclusive One Health approaches.
Photo credit: Vladimir Krupenkin / Shutterstock.com
The World Bank recently issued guidelines for 
operationalizing One Health in existing and future
projects undertaken by the Bank and its client countries 
and technical partners.166 These guidelines can serve as 
a model for other financial institutions to incorporate in 
planning processes for development and infrastructure 
projects. Furthermore, the business sector must assess its 
investments, incentive structures and business practices 
to understand the material risks of creating zoonotic 
pathogen spillovers.
For example, reformed risk assessments that incorporate 
potential hazards from zoonotic spillovers and diminished 
forest-associated health benefits can be combined with 
sustainability commitments as part of up-front financing 
for forest-converting commodities, such as soy or palm oil.
Greater efforts must be made to raise awareness among 
politicians, particularly with regards to the importance 
of investing in interdisciplinary surveillance, detection 
and preventive measures. The current crisis clearly 
demonstrates the much greater cost of not investing 
in detection, prevention and early response. However, 
curbing zoonotic disease outbreaks and their impacts 
does not stop with national decision-makers, but requires 
increased awareness-raising of risks and proactive 
mitigation steps at the level of communities, farmers, and 
individual consumers of animal and other food products.
Seafood at a fish market
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Ten key policy recommendations
As of June 2020, most papers and guidelines that discuss 
policies and actions to tackle the novel SARS-CoV-2 virus 
and COVID-19 pandemic focus on how to prevent and 
treat the disease, or how to safeguard livelihoods, secure 
nutrition and re-build national and regional economies. 
This paper focuses on recommendations based on the 
One Health approach. The recommendations set forth 
here can help governments, businesses and other actors 
not only to respond to and mitigate future disease 
outbreaks, but also to reduce the risk of their emergence. 
To this end, the following ten science-based policy 
recommendations are proposed:
1. AWARENESS: Raise awareness and increase 
understanding (knowledge) of zoonotic and 
emerging disease risks and prevention (where 
appropriate), at all levels of society to build 
widespread support for risk-reduction strategies.
2. GOVERNANCE: Increase investments in 
interdisciplinary approaches including the One 
Health perspective; strengthen the integration 
of environmental considerations in the World 
Health Organization (WHO)/Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO)/World Organisation for Animal 
Health (OIE) Tripartite Collaboration.
3. SCIENCE: Expand scientific enquiry into the complex 
social, economic and ecological dimensions of 
emerging diseases, including zoonoses, to assess 
risks and develop interventions at the interface of the 
environment, animal health and human health.
4. FINANCE: Improve cost-benefit analyses of emerging 
diseases prevention interventions to include full-
cost accounting of societal impacts of disease 
(including the cost of unintended consequences 
of interventions) so as to optimize investments 
and reduce trade-offs. Ensure ongoing and well-
resourced preparedness and response mechanisms.
5. MONITORING AND REGULATION: Develop effective 
means of monitoring and regulating practices 
associated with zoonotic disease, including food 
systems from farm to fork (particularly for removing 
structural drivers of emergence) and improving 
sanitary measures, taking into account the 
nutritional, cultural and socio-economic benefits of 
these food systems.
6. INCENTIVES: Include health considerations in 
incentives for (sustainable) food systems, including 
wildlife source foods. Augment and incentivize 
management practices to control unsustainable 
agricultural practice, wildlife consumption and trade 
(including illegal activities). Develop alternatives 
for food security and livelihoods that do not rely on 
the destruction and unsustainable exploitation of 
habitats and biodiversity.
7. BIOSECURITY AND CONTROL: Identify key drivers 
of emerging diseases in animal husbandry, both 
in industrialized agriculture (intensive husbandry 
systems) and smallholder production. Include proper 
accounting of biosecurity measures in production-
driven animal husbandry/livestock production to 
the overall cost of One Health. Incentivize proven 
and under-used animal husbandry management, 
biosecurity and zoonotic disease control measures 
for industrial and disadvantaged smallholder farmers 
and herders (e.g. through the removal of subsidies 
and perverse incentives of industrialized agriculture), 
and develop practices that strengthen the health, 
opportunity and sustainability of diverse smallholder 
systems.
8. AGRICULTURE AND WILDLIFE HABITATS: Support 
integrated management of landscapes and seascapes 
that enhance sustainable co-existence of agriculture 
and wildlife, including through investment in agro-
ecological methods of food production that mitigate 
waste and pollution while reducing risk of zoonotic 
disease transmission. Reduce further destruction and 
fragmentation of wildlife habitat by strengthening 
the implementation of existing commitments 
on habitat conservation and restoration, the 
maintenance of ecological connectivity, reduction 
of habitat loss, and incorporating biodiversity values 
in governmental and private sector decision-making 
and planning processes.
9. CAPACITY BUILDING: Strengthen existing and 
build new capacities among health stakeholders in 
all countries to improve outcomes and to help them 
understand the human, animal and environment 
health dimensions of zoonotic and other diseases.
10. OPERATIONALIZING THE ONE HEALTH APPROACH: 
Adequately mainstream and implement the One 
Health approach in land-use and sustainable 
development planning, implementation and 
monitoring, among other fields. 
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Glossary
Aerosol transmission: One of two airborne means 
of infectious disease spreading. In aerosol form, viral 
particles are suspended in the air by physical and chemical 
forces for hours or more. In droplet form, in contrast, 
viral particles remain airborne for a few seconds after 
someone sneezes or coughs and are able to travel only a 
short distance before gravitational forces pull them down.   
 STAT News
African trypanosomosis (also spelled ‘trypanosomiasis’): 
A disease of livestock (‘African animal trypanosomosis’) 
and humans (‘sleeping sickness’). These diseases 
are caused by single-celled trypanosome parasites 
(Trypanosoma brucei gambiense, Trypanosoma rhodesiense 
and Trypanosoma brucei brucei) that are transmitted to 
their animal and human hosts by the bite of trypanosome-
infected tsetse flies (genus Glossina), which are found only 
in Africa.  US CDC
Agricultural intensification: An increase in agricultural 
production per unit of inputs (e.g. labour, land, time, 
fertilizer, seed, feed, cash). This intensification has been a 
prerequisite to human civilization. Increased production 
is critical for expanding food supply; intensification that 
makes efficient use of inputs is critical for maintaining the 
health of agricultural environments.  FAO 
Anthrax: An ancient zoonotic disease that continues to 
cause serious illness in livestock, where it is a particular 
threat to cattle and small ruminants like sheep and goats. 
It can affect all warm-blooded animals, including humans. 
Treatment is possible with early diagnosis but often there 
are no symptoms and infected animals die swiftly. Humans 
generally acquire the disease directly or indirectly from 
infected animals or occupational exposure to infected or 
contaminated animal products. Although many countries 
have confirmed cases, this is not, in the main, a disease of 
wealthy countries. Incidences of both animal and human 
anthrax are frequently associated with conflict.  FAO
Anthropogenic: Caused by humans or their activities.     
 Cambridge Dictionary
Arthropod: An invertebrate animal having 
an exoskeleton, a segmented body and paired 
jointed appendages. Arthropods include insects, arachnids 
(such as ticks and spiders), myriapods and crustaceans.   
 Biologydictionary.net
Asymptomatic carriers, also known as ‘passive’ or 
‘healthy’ disease carriers: Individuals that, while infected 
with a pathogen, neither report nor appear to have any 
symptoms or signs of illness.  US CDC
Avian influenza: A severe, often fatal, type of influenza 
that affects birds, especially poultry, and that can also 
be transmitted to humans. Known informally as avian 
flu or bird flu, the type with the greatest risk is highly 
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI). Of three types of 
influenza viruses (A, B and C), influenza A virus is 
a zoonotic infection with a natural reservoir almost 
entirely in birds. Avian influenza, for most purposes, refers 
to the influenza A virus. Though influenza A is adapted 
to birds, it can also stably adapt and sustain person-to-
person transmission.  WHO
Behavioural nudging: In behavioural sciences, it is 
proposed that positive reinforcement and indirect 
suggestions can influence the behaviour and decision-
making of groups or individuals. Nudging contrasts with 
other ways to achieve compliance, such as education, 
legislation or enforcement.   UK ESRC and Wikipedia
Biodiversity: The variability among living organisms 
from all sources, including terrestrial, marine and other 
aquatic ecosystems, as well as the ecological complexes of 
which they are part. Biodiversity includes diversity within 
species, between species and of ecosystems.  CBD
Biosecurity: A series of measures aimed at preventing 
the introduction and/or spread of harmful organisms in 
order to manage the risk to people, animals, plants and 
the environment. Biosecurity covers issues such as the 
introduction of plant pests, animal pests and diseases, 
and zoonoses, the introduction and release of genetically 
modified organisms and their products, and the 
introduction and management of invasive alien species 
and genotypes. The COVID-19 pandemic is a recent 
example of a threat that requires biosecurity policies and 
regulatory measures in all relevant sectors.  FAO
Biotechnology: Any technique that encompasses a mix 
of scientific and practical disciplines and employs living 
organisms, or parts of such organisms, to make or modify 
products, to improve plants or animals or to develop 
microorganisms for specific uses. Biotechnological 
methods range from the traditional (beer- and bread-
making) to the most advanced (genetically modified 
Glossary
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plants and animals, cell therapies and nanotechnology). 
 World Bank
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE): Commonly 
known as ‘mad cow disease’, BSE is a progressive, fatal 
disease of the nervous system of cattle caused by the 
accumulation of an abnormal protein called ‘prion’ in 
nervous tissue. First detected in 1986, the implementation 
of appropriate control measures resulted in the decline of 
classical BSE cases worldwide. BSE is considered zoonotic 
due to its assumed link with the emergence of variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.  OIE
Bovine tuberculosis: Zoonotic tuberculosis is a form 
of tuberculosis in people caused by Mycobacterium 
bovis, which belongs to the M. tuberculosis complex. 
It often affects sites other than the lungs, but in many 
cases is clinically indistinguishable from TB caused by M. 
tuberculosis. Within animal populations, M. bovis is the 
causative agent of bovine TB. It mainly affects cattle, which 
are the most important animal reservoir, and can become 
established in wildlife. The disease results in important 
economic losses and trade barriers with a major impact 
on the livelihoods of poor and marginalized communities.   
 WHO-OIE-FAO
Brucellosis: A bacterial infection that spreads from 
animals to people. Most commonly, people are 
infected by eating raw or unpasteurized dairy products. 
Sometimes, the bacteria that cause brucellosis can 
spread through the air or through direct contact with 
infected animals. The infection can usually be treated 
with antibiotics but treatment takes several weeks to 
months, and the infection can recur. Brucellosis affects 
hundreds of thousands of people and animals worldwide.     
 Mayo Clinic
Campylobacter bacteria: One of four key global causes 
of diarrhoeal diseases and considered the most common 
bacterial cause of human gastroenteritis in the world. 
Campylobacter are mainly spiral-shaped, ‘S’-shaped or 
curved, rod-shaped bacteria. Campylobacter infections 
are generally mild but can be fatal among very young 
children and elderly and immunosuppressed individuals. 
In developing countries, Campylobacter infections in 
children under the age of 2 years are especially frequent, 
sometimes resulting in death. Campylobacter species can 
be killed by heat and thoroughly cooking food.  WHO
Chagas disease, also known as American 
trypanosomiasis: A potentially life-threatening 
neglected tropical disease caused by the protozoan 
parasite Trypanosoma cruzi. Found mainly in Latin 
American countries, where it is mostly vector-borne, 
often by a ‘kissing bug’, an estimated 8 million people 
are infected worldwide, mostly in Latin America. Chagas 
disease is clinically curable if treatment is initiated at an 
early stage. The disease has spread to other continents 
over the last century mainly because of greater travel. It 
is estimated that over 10,000 people die every year from 
clinical manifestations of Chagas disease and more than 
25 million people risk acquiring the disease.  WHO
Co-morbidities: More than one disease/condition present 
in an individual at the same time. Other names to describe 
co-morbid conditions are ‘co-existing’ or ‘co-occurring’ 
conditions and  ‘multimorbidity’ or ‘multiple chronic 
conditions’.  US CDC
Coronavirus disease 2019: Illness caused by a novel 
coronavirus, ‘severe acute respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus 2’ (SARS-CoV-2), which was first identified 
amid an outbreak of respiratory illness cases in East Asia. 
The outbreak was first reported to WHO on 31 December 
2019. On 30 January 2020, WHO declared the COVID-19 
outbreak a global health emergency and the following 
March a global pandemic, WHO’s first such designation 
since declaring H1N1 influenza a pandemic in 2009.          
 Medscape
Coronavirus OC43: Human coronaviruses (named for the 
crown-like spikes on their surface) were first identified in 
the mid-1960s. Seven coronaviruses can infect people. 
Four of these are common human coronaviruses, 229E, 
NL63, OC43 and HKU1, which usually cause mild to 
moderate upper-respiratory tract illnesses like the 
common cold. But three of the seven coronaviruses—
MERS-Cov, SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2—are novel and 
lethal coronaviruses that originated in animals and 
evolved in ways that, in humans, can cause serious illness 
and death.  US CDC
Crimean Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF): A viral 
haemorrhagic fever usually transmitted by ticks. It can 
also be contracted through contact with animal tissue 
where the virus has entered the bloodstream during and 
immediately post-slaughter of animals. Outbreaks of the 
disease can lead to epidemics, have a high case fatality 
ratio (10–40 per cent) and are difficult to prevent and 
treat. First described in the Crimea in 1944, the disease is 
endemic in all of Africa, the Balkans, the Middle East and in 
Asia.  WHO
Cysticercosis: A parasitic tissue infection caused by larval 
cysts of the tapeworm Taenia solium. These larval cysts 
infect brain, muscle or other tissue and are a major cause 
of adult onset seizures in most low-income countries. A 
person gets cysticercosis by swallowing eggs found in 
the faeces of a person who has an intestinal tapeworm. 
People do not get cysticercosis by eating undercooked 
pork, which can result in intestinal tapeworm if the pork 
contains larval cysts. Pigs become infected by eating 
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tapeworm eggs in the faeces of a human infected with 
a tapeworm. Both the tapeworm infection, also known 
as taeniasis, and cysticercosis occur globally. The highest 
rates of infection are found in areas of Latin America, Asia 
and Africa that have poor sanitation and free-ranging pigs 
that have access to human feces.  US CDC
DNA virus: A virus containing DNA as its genetic material 
and using a DNA–dependent DNA polymerase during 
replication. Most of these viruses must enter the host 
nucleus before they can replicate because they need the 
host cell‘s DNA polymerases when replicating their viral 
genome.  Biology Online
Droplet transmission: Respiratory infections can be 
transmitted through droplets of different sizes when 
a person is in in close contact with someone who is 
coughing or sneezing and is therefore at risk of having 
his/her mouth and nose or eyes exposed to potentially 
infective respiratory droplets. According to current 
evidence, COVID-19 virus is primarily transmitted between 
people through respiratory droplets and contact routes. In 
an analysis of 75,465 COVID-19 cases in East Asia, airborne 
transmission was not reported.  WHO
Early warning systems: Complex tools and processes 
aiming to reduce the impact of natural hazards by 
providing timely and relevant information in a systematic 
way.  UNDP
Eastern equine encephalitis virus (EEE virus) is spread 
by mosquitoes and is a rare cause of brain infections 
(encephalitis). It can infect horses, causing fever, 
behavioural changes, and other symptoms of encephalitis, 
and infection is often deadly for the horse. Only a few 
human cases are reported in the United States each year, 
most in eastern or Gulf Coast states. Approximately 30 
per cent of people with eastern equine encephalitis die 
and many survivors have ongoing neurologic problems.          
 US CDC
Ebola virus disease (EVD): A rare and deadly disease in 
people and nonhuman primates. The viruses that cause 
Ebola are located mainly in sub-Saharan Africa. People can 
get Ebola through direct contact with an infected animal 
(bat or nonhuman primate) or a sick or dead person 
infected with Ebolavirus.  US CDC
Echinococcosis: A parasitic disease that occurs in two 
main forms in humans: cystic echinococcosis (also 
known as hydatidosis or hydatid disease) and alveolar 
echinococcosis, caused by the tapeworms. Dogs, foxes 
and other carnivores harbour the adult worms in their 
intestine and evacuate the parasite eggs in their faeces. 
If the eggs are ingested by humans, they develop into 
larvae in several organs, mainly the liver and lungs. Both 
cystic and alveolar echinococcosis are characterized by 
asymptomatic incubation periods that can last many 
years until the parasite larvae evolve and trigger clinical 
signs. Both diseases can cause serious morbidity and 
death. Treatment is often difficult. The disease occurs in 
most areas of the world and currently affects about one 
million people. Prevention of cystic disease is by treating 
dogs that may carry the disease and vaccination of sheep.    
 WHO
EcoHealth: An emerging field that examines the 
complex relationships among humans, animals and the 
environment, and how these relationships affect the 
health of each of these domains. One Health deals with 
biomedical questions, with an emphasis on zoonoses, 
and is historically more health science-driven. In contrast, 
the EcoHealth concept is defined as an ecosystem 
approach to health, tending to focus on environmental 
and socio-economic issues and initially designed by 
disease ecologists working in the field of biodiversity 
conservation.  Roger et al. 2016; Lisitza and Wolbring 
2018
Ecosystem: A dynamic complex of vegetable, animal 
and microorganism communities and their nonliving 
environment that interact as a functional unit. Ecosystems 
may be small and simple, like an isolated pond, or large 
and complex, like a specific tropical rainforest or a coral 
reef in tropical seas.  IUCN
Ecosystem degradation: A long-term reduction in an 
ecosystem’s structure, functionality, or capacity to provide 
benefits to people.  IPBES
El Niño: The term refers to the large-scale ocean-
atmosphere climate interaction linked to a periodic 
warming in sea surface temperatures across the central 
and east-central Equatorial Pacific. El Niño and La Niña are 
opposite phases of what is known as the El Niño-Southern 
Oscillation (ENSO) cycle. The ENSO cycle is a scientific term 
that describes the fluctuations in temperature between 
the ocean and atmosphere in the east-central Equatorial 
Pacific (approximately between the International Date 
Line and 120 degrees West).  El Niño is sometimes referred 
to as the warm phase of ENSO, and La Niña as the cold 
phase of ENSO. These deviations from normal surface 
temperatures can have large-scale impacts not only on 
ocean processes, but also on global weather and climate. 
 US NOAA
Emerging infectious disease: Infections that have 
recently appeared within a population or those whose 
incidence or geographic range is rapidly increasing or 
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Endemic disease: The constant presence and/or usual 
prevalence of a disease or infectious agent in a population 
within a geographic area.  US CDC
Endemic zoonoses are found throughout the developing 
world, wherever people live in close proximity to their 
animals, affecting not only the health of poor people 
but often also their livelihoods through the health of 
their livestock. Unlike newly emerging zoonoses that 
attract the attention of the developed world, these 
endemic zoonoses are by comparison neglected. This is, 
in part, a consequence of under-reporting, resulting in 
underestimation of their global burden, which in turn 
artificially downgrades their importance in the eyes of 
administrators and funding agencies.  Maudlin et al. 2009
[The] environment: The natural world, as a whole or in 
a particular geographical area, especially as affected by 
human activity.  Oxford Dictionary
Environment health vs environmental health: 
‘Environment health’ refers to the health of the 
environment and is used in this report to distinguish it 
from the term ‘environmental health’, which is the branch 
of public health concerned with all aspects of the natural 
and built environment affecting human health. (Authors of 
this report)
Epidemic: The occurrence in a community or region of 
cases of an illness, specific health-related behaviour, or 
other health-related events clearly in excess of normal 
expectancy. The community or region and the period in 
which the cases occur are specified precisely.  WHO
False negative: A test result that wrongly indicates that 
a particular condition or attribute is absent.  Oxford 
Dictionary
False positive: A test result which wrongly indicates that 
a particular condition or attribute is present.  Oxford 
Dictionary
FAO, OIE, WHO Tripartite Alliance: A collaboration 
between the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 
the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the 
World Health Organization (WHO) to address risks from 
zoonoses and other public health threats existing and 
emerging at the human-animal-ecosystems interface and 
provide guidance on how to reduce these risks. These 
three organisations have worked together for many years 
to prevent, detect, control and eliminate health threats 
to humans, originating—directly or indirectly—from 
animals. Putting the ‘One Health’ vision into practice has 
been facilitated by a formal alliance the three organisations 
established in 2010, acknowledging their respective 
responsibilities in combating diseases which have a severe 
impact on health and the economy, particularly zoonoses. 
 FAO; OIE; WHO
Fomite transmission refers to the transmission of 
infectious diseases by objects. It occurs when an 
inanimate object contaminated with or exposed to 
infectious agents (such as pathogenic bacteria, viruses 
or fungi) serve as a mechanism for transfer to a new host.    
 Verywell Health 
Food value chains comprise all the stakeholders who 
participate in the coordinated production and value-
adding activities that are needed to make food products. 
 FAO 
Great apes: The great apes have traditionally comprised 
six species—chimpanzee, bonobo, Sumatran orangutan, 
Bornean orangutan, eastern gorilla and western lowland 
gorilla. In 2017 scientists identified a third orangutan 
species: the Tapanuli orangutan (Pongo tapanuliensis), 
which is restricted to South Tapanuli, on the island of 
Sumatra, in Indonesia, and is on the critically endangered 
species list.  Great Apes Survival Partnership; Nater et al. 
2017
Great ape range states: The 21 countries in Equatorial 
Africa and in 2 countries in Southeast Asia where the great 
apes—chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas and orangutans—
dwell, forage, reproduce and migrate.  WWF
Guano: The excrement of seabirds and bats, used as 
fertilizer.  Oxford Dictionary
Habitat: The natural home or environment of an animal, 
plant or other organism.  Oxford Dictionary
Habitat fragmentation: A general term describing the set 
of processes by which habitat loss results in the division 
of continuous habitats into a greater number of smaller 
patches of lesser total and isolated from each other by a 
matrix of dissimilar habitats. Habitat fragmentation may 
occur through natural processes (e.g., forest and grassland 
fires, flooding) and through human activities (forestry, 
agriculture, urbanization). Habitat loss and fragmentation 
have long been considered the primary cause for 
biodiversity loss and ecosystem degradation worldwide. 
Habitat fragmentation often refers to the reduction of 
continuous tracts of habitat to smaller, spatially distinct 
remnant patches. Although some habitats are naturally 
patchy in terms of abiotic and biotic conditions, human 
actions have profoundly fragmented landscapes across 
the word, altering the quality and connectivity of habitats.   
 IPBES; Wilson et al. 2015
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Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI): A highly 
contagious disease caused by viruses that occur mainly 
in birds and that can be deadly, especially in domestic 
poultry. Since 2003, an Asian HPAI H5N1 virus has resulted 
in high mortality in poultry and wild birds in Asia, the 
Middle East, Europe and Africa and has become endemic 
in some countries.  US CDC
Host: An organism infected with or fed upon by a parasitic 
or pathogenic organism (for example, a virus, nematode, 
fungus). An animal or plant that nourishes and supports a 
parasite; the host does not benefit and is often harmed by 
the association.  Biology Online
Host plasticity: The ability of a virus to infect a diverse 
range of hosts, such as bats, rodents, and primates.              
 UC Davis One Health Institute
Human T-cell lymphotropic virus (HTLV): HTLV is a type 
of retrovirus that infects a type of white blood cell called 
a T-lymphocyte. HTLV can cause cancer. Simian T-cell 
leukemia viruses (STLVs) that infect Old World monkeys 
are the simian counterparts of HTLV, and these viruses are 
collectively called primate T-cell leukemia viruses (PTLVs).  
The close relationship between HTLV type 1 and STLV 
type 1 suggests a simian origin for HTLV type 1 as a result 
of multiple interspecies transmissions between primates 
and humans and also between different primate species.           
 Courgnaud et al. 2004
Infectivity: In epidemiology, infectivity is the ability of a 
pathogen to enter, survive and multiply in the host and 
ultimately establish an infection. A pathogen’s infectivity 
is subtly but importantly different from its transmissibility, 
which refers to a pathogen’s capacity to spread from one 
organism to another.  UCLA Fielding School of Public 
Health; Wikipedia
Inflammatory bowel disease (IBD): An umbrella term 
for two disorders that involve chronic inflammation of 
the digestive tract—Crohn’s disease and ulcerative colitis, 
which are characterized by chronic inflammation of the 
gastrointestinal tract, which is damaged by prolonged 
inflammation.  US CDC
Japanese encephalitis virus (JEV): A flavivirus related to 
dengue, yellow fever, and West Nile viruses and spread by 
mosquitoes. It is found principally in Asia and the Western 
Pacific and is the main cause of viral encephalitis in many 
countries of Asia, with an estimated 68,000 clinical cases 
every year. There is no cure for the disease.  WHO
La Niña: La Niña episodes represent periods of below-
average sea surface temperatures across the east-
central Equatorial Pacific. During a La Niña year, winter 
temperatures are warmer than normal in the Southeast 
and cooler than normal in the Northwest Pacific. Global 
climate La Niña impacts tend to be opposite those of El 
Niño impacts. See also El Niño.  US NOAA
Leishmaniasis: A disease caused by the protozoan 
Leishmania parasites which are transmitted by the 
bite of infected sandflies. There are three main forms 
of leishmaniases—visceral (also known as kala-azar, 
which is usually fatal if untreated), cutaneous (the most 
common) and mucocutaneous. The disease affects some 
of the poorest people on earth and is associated with 
malnutrition, population displacement, poor housing 
and a weak immune system. Leishmaniasis is linked to 
environmental changes such as deforestation, building of 
dams, irrigation schemes and urbanization. An estimated 
700,000 to 1 million new cases occur annually.  WHO
Leptospirosis: A bacterial disease affecting humans and 
animals caused by bacteria of the genus Leptospira. In 
humans, it can cause a wide range of symptoms such 
as fever, headache, diarrhoea, muscle ache. Without 
treatment, Leptospirosis can lead to kidney damage, 
meningitis (inflammation of the membrane around the 
brain and spinal cord), liver failure, respiratory distress, 
and even death. The bacteria that cause leptospirosis 
are spread through the urine of infected animals, which 
can get into water or soil and can survive there for weeks 
to months. Many different kinds of wild and domestic 
animals carry the bacterium.  US CDC
Listeriosis: Foodborne listeriosis, caused by the bacteria 
Listeria monocytogenes, is one of the most serious 
and severe foodborne diseases. It is a relatively rare 
disease but the high rate of death associated with this 
infection makes it a significant public health concern. 
Listeria monocytogenes are widely distributed in nature. 
They can be found in soil, water, vegetation and the 
faeces of some animals and can contaminate foods. 
Vegetables may be contaminated through soil or the 
use of manure as fertilizer. Ready-to-eat food can also 
become contaminated during processing and the bacteria 
can multiply to dangerous levels during distribution 
and storage. Unlike many other common foodborne 
diseases causing bacteria, L. monocytogenes can survive 
and multiply at low temperatures usually found in 
refrigerators.  WHO
Lockdown: A state of isolation or restricted access 
instituted as a security measure.  Oxford Dictionary
Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS): A viral 
respiratory disease caused by a novel coronavirus (Middle 
East respiratory syndrome coronavirus, or MERS-CoV) that 
was first identified in Saudi Arabia in 2012. Typical MERS 
symptoms include fever, cough and shortness of breath. 
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Approximately 35 per cent of reported patients with 
MERS have died. The virus does not seem to pass easily 
from person to person and most human cases of MERS 
have been attributed to human-to-human infections in 
health care settings. The largest outbreaks have occurred 
in Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and the Republic of 
Korea. Current scientific evidence suggests that dromedary 
camels are a major reservoir host for MERS-CoV and an 
animal source of MERS infection in humans.  WHO
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-
CoV): A coronavirus causing Middle East respiratory 
syndrome (MERS).  WHO
Molecular epidemiology: A discipline that uses molecular 
or genetic markers to trace the development of a disease in 
a population and to understand transmission as well as the 
population structure and evolution of bacterial pathogens. 
 ScienceDirect 
Multidisciplinary: Combining or involving several 
academic disciplines or professional specializations in an 
approach to a topic or problem.  Oxford Dictionary 
Natural environment: All living and non-living things that 
occur naturally on a particular region where human impact 
is kept under a certain limited level.  Biology Online
Neglected zoonotic diseases include anthrax, brucellosis, 
foodborne trematodiases, human African trypanosomosis, 
leishmaniasis, leptospirosis, non-malarial febrile illnesses, 
schistosomiasis, rabies and taeniasis/cysticercosis. 
These neglected zoonoses are found in communities 
in low-resource settings across the world, where they 
impose a dual burden on people’s health and that of the 
livestock they depend upon. Their management requires 
collaborative, cross-sectoral efforts of human and animal 
health systems and a multidisciplinary approach that 
considers the complexities of the ecosystems where 
humans and animals coexist. Where feasible, preventing 
and mitigating their occurrence in humans requires 
their elimination in their animal reservoirs. National 
governments are increasingly implementing control 
programmes to address these burdens. These initiatives 
have been strongly endorsed by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, the World Organisation 
for Animal Health and World Health Organization Tripartite 
and financially supported the international community, 
including the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the UK 
Department for International Development, the European 
Union, the International Development Research Centre and 
CGIAR.  WHO
Non-random and random sampling: In random data 
collection, every individual observation has equal 
probability to be selected into a sample and there should 
be no pattern when drawing a sample. Although random 
sampling is generally the preferred survey method, 
few people doing surveys use it because of prohibitive 
costs. The method requires numbering each member of 
the survey population, whereas nonrandom sampling  
involves taking every nth member. Findings indicate 
that as long as the attribute being sampled is randomly 
distributed among the population, the two methods 
give essentially the same results. If the attribute is not 
randomly distributed, the two methods give radically 
different results. In some instances the nonrandom 
methods yield much better inferences about the 
population; in other instances, its inferences are much 
worse.  Rand Corporation; Statistics Solutions
One Health: A collaborative, multisectoral, and trans-
disciplinary approach—working at local, regional, 
national and global levels—to achieve optimal health and 
well-being outcomes recognizing the interconnections 
between people, animals, plants and their shared 
environments.  One Health Commission
Pandemic: The worldwide spread of a new disease. An 
influenza pandemic occurs when a new influenza virus 
emerges and spreads around the world and most people 
do not have immunity.  WHO
Pathogen: Any microorganism able to cause disease in a 
host organism.  British Society for Immunology
Pathogenicity: The absolute ability of an infectious agent 
to cause disease/damage in a host—an infectious agent is 
either pathogenic or not.  ScienceDirect 
Peridomestic: Pertaining to living in and around 
human habitations. The rat is a peridomestic animal.                        
 WordSense Dictionary
Permafrost: A thick subsurface layer of soil that remains 
frozen throughout the year, occurring chiefly in polar 
regions.  Oxford Dictionary
Phylogenetic analysis: Phylogeny is the relationship 
between all the organisms on Earth that have descended 
from a common ancestor, whether they are extinct or 
extant. Phylogenetics is the science of studying the 
evolutionary relatedness among biological groups and 
a phylogenetic tree is used to graphically represent this 
evolutionary relation related to the species of interest.      
 ScienceDirect
Planetary health is defined as “the achievement of the 
highest attainable standard of health, wellbeing, and 
equity worldwide through judicious attention to the 
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human systems—political, economic, and social—that 
shape the future of humanity and the Earth’s natural 
systems that define the safe environmental limits within 
which humanity can flourish. Put simply, planetary 
health is the health of human civilization and the state 
of the natural systems on which it depends”. In 2014 the 
Rockefeller Foundation and The Lancet jointly formed the 
Commission on Planetary Health to review the scientific 
basis for linking human health to the underlying integrity 
of Earth’s natural system.  The Rockefeller Foundation–
Lancet Commission on Planetary Health
Porcine epidemic diarrhoea (PED): A non-zoonotic viral 
disease of pigs caused by a coronavirus and characterized 
by watery diarrhoea and weight loss. First identified 
and reported in 1971, it affects pigs of all ages, but most 
severely neonatal piglets, reaching a morbidity and 
mortality of up to 100 per cent, with mortality decreasing 
as age increases. It is a contagious disease transmissible 
mainly by the faecal-oral route. The prevention and 
management control are focused on strict biosecurity 
and early detection. There is no specific treatment for the 
disease.  WHO
Pristine areas: Pristine means still in its original condition, 
such as a forest that hasn’t been logged or damaged by 
humans.  YourDictionary
Q fever: A disease caused by bacteria of the species 
Coxiella burnetii. This bacterium naturally infects some 
animals, such as goats, sheep and cattle. These bacteria 
are found in the birth products (i.e. placenta, amniotic 
fluid), urine, faeces and milk of infected animals. People 
can get infected by breathing in dust that has been 
contaminated by infected animal faeces, urine, milk and 
birth products or by eating contaminated unpasteurized 
dairy products. Some people never get sick; those who do 
usually develop flu-like symptoms. In a small percentage 
of people, the infection can resurface years later. This more 
deadly form of Q fever can damage the heart, liver, brain 
and lungs.  US CDC 
R
0 
is the basic reproduction number (also called the ‘basic 
reproduction ratio’ or ‘rate’ or the ‘basic reproductive 
rate’). It refers to the expected number of secondary 
infections arising from a single individual during his or 
her entire infectious period, in a population of susceptible 
individuals. This concept is fundamental to the study of 
epidemiology and within-host pathogen dynamics. Most 
importantly, R
0
 often serves as a threshold parameter that 
predicts whether an infection will spread.  Heffernan et 
al. 2005
Rabies: A vaccine-preventable, zoonotic, viral disease. 
Once clinical symptoms appear, rabies is virtually 100 
per cent fatal. It can spread to people and pets if they 
are bitten or scratched by a rabid animal. In up to 99 
per cent of cases, domestic dogs are responsible for 
rabies virus transmission to humans but it can affect 
both domestic and wild animals. The virus can cause 
disease in the brain, ultimately resulting in death. Rabies 
is present on all continents, except Antarctica, with over 
95 per cent of human deaths occurring in the Asia and 
Africa regions. Rabies is one of the ‘neglected tropical 
diseases that predominantly affects poor and vulnerable 
populations who live in remote rural locations. Although 
effective human vaccines and immunoglobulins exist for 
rabies, they are not readily available or accessible to those 
in need.  WHO 
Recombinant DNA: The joining together of DNA 
molecules from different organisms and inserting it into 
a host organism to produce new genetic combinations 
that are of value to science, medicine, agriculture and 
industry. The DNA sequences used in the construction 
of recombinant DNA molecules can originate from 
any species. For example, plant DNA may be joined to  
bacterial DNA, or human DNA may be joined with fungal 
DNA. In addition, DNA sequences that do not occur 
anywhere in nature may be created by the chemical 
synthesis of DNA and incorporated into recombinant 
molecules. Using recombinant DNA technology and 
synthetic DNA, any DNA sequence may be created 
and introduced into any of a very wide range of living 
organisms.  Encyclopedia Britannica; Biology Online; 
Wikipedia
Reservoir: The habitat in which the agent normally lives, 
grows, and multiplies. Reservoirs include humans, animals, 
and the environment. The reservoir may or may not be 
the source from which an agent is transferred to a host.            
 US CDC
Reservoir host: A primary host that harbours a 
pathogen but shows no ill effects and serves as a source 
of infection. Once discovered, natural reservoirs elucidate 
the complete life cycle of infectious diseases, providing 
effective prevention and control.  Biology Online
Rift Valley fever (RVF): A mosquito-borne viral zoonotic 
disease that affects sheep, goats, cattle and camels, 
causing devastating losses, especially among pastoral 
communities that rely on livestock for their livelihoods. 
The disease occurs in explosive outbreaks following 
periods of above-normal and persistent rainfall. People 
can become infected with Rift Valley fever after being 
bitten by an infected mosquito or through close contact 
with acutely infected animals or their tissues. In people, 
the disease manifests itself as a mild influenza-like 
syndrome in over 80 per cent of cases or a severe disease 
with haemorrhagic fever, encephalitis or retinitis in a few 
cases. Because of its episodic occurrence and predilection 
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for remote pastoral areas, the impact of the disease 
is often exacerbated by delays in the deployment of 
prevention and control measures. Livestock vaccination is 
regarded as the most reliable method for controlling the 
disease.  ILRI
RNA viruses are those containing RNA as its genetic 
material. The RNA may be single stranded or double 
stranded. Examples of RNA viruses include Reoviruses, 
Picornaviruses, Togaviruses, Orthomyxoviruses, 
Rhabdoviruses, etc. A virus containing RNA as its genetic 
material. The RNA may be single stranded or double 
stranded. Examples of RNA viruses include Reoviruses, 
Picornaviruses, Togaviruses, Orthomyxoviruses and 
Rhabdoviruses. Most RNA viruses replicate in the 
cytoplasm of the host cells. Examples of human 
diseases caused by RNA viruses are SARS, influenza and 
hepatitis C.  Biology Online
Salmonella bacteria cause foodborne illness, commonly 
called food poisoning, with symptoms of diarrhoea, fever 
and stomach cramps. It is estimated that Salmonella 
causes one million foodborne illnesses every year in 
the United States. In the past few years, outbreaks of 
Salmonella illness have been linked to contaminated 
cucumbers, pre-cut melon, chicken, eggs, pistachios,     
raw tuna, sprouts, and many other foods.  US CDC
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): A viral 
respiratory illness caused by a coronavirus, SARS-
associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV). First reported in 
Asia in 2003, the illness spread to more than two dozen 
countries in North America, South America, Europe 
and Asia before the SARS global outbreak of 2003 was 
contained. Since 2004, no known cases of SARS have 
reported anywhere in the world.  US CDC
Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 
(SARS-CoV-2): A novel coronavirus causing the 2019–
2020 coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. On 11 
February 2020, WHO named the new virus SARS-CoV-2 
because the virus is genetically related to the coronavirus 
responsible for the SARS outbreak of 2003. While 
related, the two viruses are different. WHO announced 
‘COVID-19’ as the name of this new disease on the same 
day, following guidelines previously developed with the 
World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).    
 WHO
Social distancing, also called ‘physical distancing’, means 
keeping six feet (two meters) of space between yourself 
and other people outside of your home, not gathering in 
groups, staying out of crowded places and avoiding mass 
gatherings.  US CDC
Simian: Relating to, resembling, or affecting apes or 
monkeys.  Oxford Dictionary
Sooty mangabey: Also known as the white-crowned or 
white-collared mangabey (Cercocebus atys), the sooty 
mangabey is a mostly terrestrial Old World monkey. Its 
distribution once ranged from the Casamance River in 
Senegal to the Sassandra/Nzo River system. Today, the 
species’ conservation status is ‘near-threatened’, with its 
range now restricted to the west coast of Africa in Sierra 
Leone, Liberia and the western part of Ivory Coast, where 
these foraging monkeys can be found walking along the 
forest floor gathering fruits and seeds. Sooty mangabeys 
are considered to be mostly extinct in their former 
habitats in Senegal, Guinea-Bissau and parts of Guinea.    
 New England Primate Conservancy 
Sustainable agricultural intensification: A concept that 
challenges global agriculture (crops, livestock, forests, 
fisheries) to achieve a doubling in world food production 
while sustaining the environment in which we live. 
Food production efficiency needs to double in order to 
feed a growing global population using only currently 
available land while protecting our living environment 
and conserving natural and agricultural biodiversity. 
Sustainable agricultural intensification provides the means 
to do this with limited available resources. This ambition 
is highlighted in the Sustainable Development Goals. The 
resources to achieve this increase in food production will 
not increase, so the efficiency with which they are used 
will have to be enhanced to ensure ecosystems services 
are maintained. Sustainability also requires ensuring social 
equity in the productive and environmental benefits 
from sustainable agricultural intensification, otherwise 
the poorer sections of the farming population and 
women farmers risk being left behind or displaced by the 
promotion of intensification.  NRI
Vector: An organism or vehicle that transmits the 
causative agent or disease-causing organism from the 
reservoir to the host. Often thought of as a biting insect 
or tick but can be an animal or inanimate object. Many 
living vectors are bloodsucking insects and ticks, which 
ingest disease-producing microorganisms during a 
blood meal from an infected host (human or animal) 
and later transmit it into a new host, after the pathogen 
has replicated. Often, once a vector becomes infectious, 
they are capable of transmitting the pathogen for the 
rest of their life during each subsequent bite/blood meal.      
 Biology Online; WHO
Vector-borne diseases: Human illnesses caused by 
parasites, viruses and bacteria that are transmitted by 
vectors. Vector-borne diseases account for more than 
17 per cent of all infectious diseases, causing more than 
700,000 deaths annually.  WHO
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Vermin: Wild animals that are believed to be harmful to 
crops, farm animals, or game, or that carry disease, e.g., 
rodents.  Oxford Dictionary
Virion: An entire virus particle, consisting of an outer 
protein shell, called a capsid, and an inner core of 
nucleic acid, either RNA or DNA. The core confers 
infectivity and the capsid provides specificity to the virus.        
 Encyclopaedia Britannica
Virulence: the degree by which a pathogenic organism 
can cause disease in a host.  Virulence is the measurement 
of pathogenicity—the ability of a pathogen to cause 
disease. Highly virulent pathogens are more likely to 
cause disease in a host.  The virulence of a pathogen is 
often correlated with the so-called virulence factors that 
enables an organism to invade a host and cause disease. 
 Biology Online; LibreTexts
Virus: An infectious agent of small size and simple 
composition that can multiply only in living cells of 
animals, plants or bacteria. The name is from a Latin word 
meaning “slimy liquid” or “poison.”    Encyclopaedia 
Britannica
West Nile virus (WNV): A member of the Flavivirus genus 
that belongs to the Japanese encephalitis antigenic 
complex of the family Flaviviridae. Commonly found in 
Africa, Europe, the Middle East, North America and West 
Asia, the virus is maintained in nature in a cycle involving 
transmission between birds and mosquitoes. Horses and 
other mammals can be infected along with humans, in 
whom it causes neurological disease and death.  WHO
Wet market, also called public, informal and traditional 
market. The term ‘wet market’ is considered a pejorative 
by some, so this report uses the term ‘informal market’. All 
these terms refer to a marketplace selling fresh meat, 
fish, produce and other perishable goods as distinguished 
from ‘dry markets’ that sell durable goods such as fabric 
and electronics. Not all wet markets sell live animals, but 
the term is sometimes used to signify a live animal market 
in which vendors slaughter animals upon customer 
purchase. Wet markets are common in many parts of 
the world and include a wide variety of markets, such 
as farmers’ markets, fish markets and wildlife markets. 
They often play critical roles in urban food security due 
to factors of pricing, freshness of food, social interaction, 
and local cultures. Most wet markets do not trade in wild 
or exotic animals, but have been linked to outbreaks 
of zoonotic disease. One such market was believed to 
have played a role in the COVID-19 pandemic, although 
investigations into whether the virus originated from 
non-market sources are ongoing as of April 2020.                        
 BBC; Wikipedia
Wild meat, more commonly called ‘bushmeat’ (in this 
report, we prefer to use the term ‘wild meat’). Wildlife 
makes an essential contribution to food security for many 
people worldwide. Estimated bushmeat consumption 
in the Congo Basin alone is over 4 million tonnes per 
year. For many, wild meat may be the main type of meat 
available, an important component of food diversity or 
a food that contributes to cultural identity. Wild meat 
is a natural healthy food, although (as with domestic 
stock) its use may carry health risks related to zoonoses—
diseases transmitted to humans through the handling 
or consumption of animals. Declines in wildlife due to 
over-hunting or other causes, whether direct (e.g. habitat 
degradation) or indirect (e.g. weak governance or climate 
change) could significantly affect many people´s food 
security and nutritional health. Furthermore, an increasing 
number of vertebrate species are being hunted to 
dangerously low levels as a result of increased commercial 
demand for meat and medicines, with many now in 
danger of extinction.  FAO
Zika virus: A mosquito-borne flavivirus first identified in 
Uganda in 1947 in monkeys. Zika virus disease is caused 
by a virus transmitted primarily by Aedes mosquitoes, 
which bite during the day. Most people infected with 
the Zika virus do not develop symptoms, and those 
that do suffer mild symptoms (fever, rash, conjunctivitis, 
muscle and joint pain, malaise or headache) for 2–7 days. 
Zika virus infection during pregnancy can cause infants 
to be born with microcephaly and other congenital 
malformations, known as congenital Zika syndrome, and 
is associated with other complications of pregnancy, 
including preterm birth and miscarriage. Outbreaks of 
Zika virus disease have been reported in Africa, Asia and 
the Americas.  WHO
Zoonoses: Diseases that can spread between animals 
and people, moving from wild and domesticated animals 
to humans and from humans to animals. Every year, 
nearly 60,000 people die from rabies, and other zoonotic 
diseases such as avian influenza, Ebola and Rift Valley 
fever constitute additional threats. These diseases affect 
not only human health but also animal health and welfare 
by causing lowered productivity (e.g. in terms of milk or 
egg quality and safety) or death, with significant harm to 
farmer livelihoods and national economies. The current 
COVID-19 pandemic is a zoonotic disease.  FAO; WHO
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